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SHARING THE GREEN:  
REFORMATTING WISCONSIN’S FORGOTTEN 
GREEN SPACE GRANT WITH A PUBLIC–
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP DESIGN 
Despite the vast amount of legal research available on brownfields 
redevelopment generally, little has been done on the value of brownfield-
to-greenspace conversions.  Brownfield-to-greenspace conversions that 
incorporate public–private partnership elements may trigger private 
investment in brownfields when the market alone fails to induce 
development of contaminated lands.  Brownfield-to-greenspace 
partnerships are a flexible way to redevelop brownfields and maintain 
complete stakeholder involvement in the cleanup and ownership process.  
Currently, an unfunded Wisconsin program is set up to provide grants to 
municipalities for brownfield-to-greenspace conversions.  Wisconsin 
municipalities have used this grant successfully in the past to improve 
local economic prospects simply by investing in small-scale brownfield-
to-greenspace conversions. 
This Comment breaks down why programs that encourage 
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions should continue to be funded.  
Investments in greenspace may be small, yet resulting economic prospects 
through property-value improvements and job creation can be large in 
some circumstances.  This Comment assesses how the Wisconsin 
brownfield-to-greenspace program could be made more attractive and 
feasible if it allowed for public–private partnership; at the moment, the 
Wisconsin program is limited to municipalities and has a deed restriction 
whereby private entities are not allowed to use the land associated with the 
grant for a number of years.  Ultimately, brownfield-to-greenspace 
redevelopments may be best performed through public–private 
partnerships where more stakeholders have access to funding and 
influence on project developments. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenarios: 
 
 A waterway is restored and a public space is created with 
flowing water connected to the adjacent river. The 
surrounding office space becomes more desirable and the 
vacancy rate decreases.  New developments are planned 
to take advantage of this new amenity. 
 A park is built on a former landfill site with connections 
to a network of bike paths along the local river system. 
This in turn, attracts a company to relocate into the 
community because they feel it will reduce employee 
turnover. 
 An old store with a parking lot on main street is 
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converted into a plaza with some small retail space, a 
café, and a public bathroom. The project creates an 
outdoor gathering place that initiates a revitalization of 
the area. Property owners reinvest in their buildings, 
more pedestrians wander the area and new commercial 
businesses move in to enjoy the scene or to capitalize on 
the retail potential.1 
 
Each example depicts a former contaminated or blighted property that 
is converted into public park space with resulting economic benefits to a 
community.  The number of brownfields across America is estimated to 
be between 500,000 and 1 million.2  And with that number continually 
rising, it is important for states to develop creative redevelopment 
programs.  Brownfield-to-greenspace programs are one option. 
From a development standpoint, the need for remediation exists 
because brownfields create blight and decrease property values.3  
However, heavy liabilities and exorbitant costs limit the attractiveness of 
brownfields to private developers searching for development land on 
the open market.4  Incorporating public spaces into remediation efforts 
is a promising approach to redeveloping brownfields because 
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions can be done resourcefully 
through publicly driven efforts, and the added greenspace can provide 
communities with unique economic benefits.5  The economic benefits 
 
1. USC CTR. FOR ECON. DEV., LEVERAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT CAPITAL FOR 
BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT 3–4 (2003) [hereinafter LEVERAGING 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT]. 
2. Brownfields: Lessons From the Field: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Water 
Resources & Env’t, 107th Cong. 33 (2001) (statement of Rep. Earl Blumenauer); id. at 53 
(testimony of R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President, Gov’t Affairs, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce); Brownfields to Biomass: Tapping EPA’s Grant Programs, BIOMASS HUB (Apr. 
20, 2010), http://www.biomasshub.com/brownfields-biomass-tapping-epa-grant-programs/. 
3. See, e.g., Robert A. Simons & Jesse D. Saginor, A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of 
Environmental Contamination and Positive Amenities on Residential Real Estate Values, 28 J. 
REAL EST. RES. 71, 83, 97 (2006) (providing statistically significant findings that property 
values decrease with closer proximity to environmental contamination); Diana A. Silva, Note, 
Land Banking as a Tool for the Economic Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities, 
3 DREXEL L. REV. 607, 610–11 (2011) (highlighting empirical data that showed property 
values in major American cities dipping as a result of abandoned properties). 
4. See infra Part II.C.  Remediation expenses are largely based upon the investigations, 
removals, and management of environmental cleanups.  Deborah K. Tellier et al., Turning 
Brown into Green: Practical Considerations for Lenders and Buyers of Contaminated Property 
in a Red Economy, 27 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 20, 20 (2009). 
5. CHRISTOPHER DE SOUSA, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND THE QUEST FOR 
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include improved property values, added jobs, and enhanced tax bases 
that result from an area’s increased attractiveness to business and 
residential development. 
Some community leaders consider brownfields to be the “number-
one obstacle to urban redevelopment.”6  Many others believe that 
redeveloping brownfields is one way for urban centers to achieve 
“economic self-sufficiency.”7  As a result, numerous state and local 
initiatives have tried to tackle brownfields issues.8  Still, brownfield-to-
greenspace conversions and public–private partnership efforts may be 
underutilized. 
Converting brownfields into greenspace and encouraging 
partnerships between public and private entities in redeveloping 
brownfields could rejuvenate residential and economic areas where 
“brownfields have accumulated and dragged down the quality of 
life.”9  It is important to further brownfields redevelopment because a 
brownfield project may “act as a catalyst for large-scale community 
revitalization efforts.”10  State laws must encourage creative and efficient 
ways of remediating properties, such as converting brownfields to 
greenspace—and states should be careful to not strip funding away from 
creative brownfields redevelopment programs proven successful in the 
past. 
Part II of this Comment provides background on America’s 
brownfields problem, highlights reasons why communities should 
cleanup and redevelop contaminated sites, and then describes the 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 177 (2008) (highlighting that urban greenway developments “are usually 
tied to a broader economic development oriented strategy that sees residential and 
commercial development springing up along the greenway”). 
6. Todd S. Davis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 9 (Todd S. 
Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS] (noting that Cleveland’s former mayor, 
Mike White, called contamination the “number-one obstacle to urban redevelopment”). 
7. John C. Chambers, Community Participation in Brownfields Redevelopment, in 
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 243, 245. 
8. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Strategies for Implementing the Environmental 
Justice Vision, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 327–28 (2007); Kris Wernstedt et al., The 
Brownfields Phenomenon: Much Ado About Something or the Timing of the Shrewd? 1 (Res. 
for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 04-46, 2004). 
9. Juha Siikamäki & Kris Wernstedt, Turning Brownfields into Greenspaces: Examining 
Incentives and Barriers to Revitalization, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 559, 559–60 (2008). 
10. For EPA’s Brownfields Program, “Green” Refers to More than the Environment, 
BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2003 [hereinafter More than 
the Environment], available at http://epa.gov/brownfields/success/Green_Money.pdf. 
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disincentives that dissuade private entities and communities from 
investing in these lands.  Part III first describes attempts taken by the 
federal government and states to cure the shortcomings of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA)11 and then identifies innovative remediation methods 
that are less often utilized.  Part IV points out that municipalities have 
more options than private entities to be creative through brownfield 
cleanup efforts.  Arguably, municipalities should use this advantage to 
incorporate greenspace in redevelopment efforts because converting 
brownfields to greenspace can boost economic prospects.  Part V 
identifies two innovative Wisconsin remediation programs—most 
notably, the Wisconsin Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities 
Grant Program (Green Space Grant), which presently lacks funding—
and offers examples of two Wisconsin cities that successfully converted 
brownfields into greenspace with assistance from the Green Space 
Grant.  Finally, Part VI argues that Wisconsin must not only maintain its 
brownfield-to-greenspace grant program, but also alter it to allow for 
use by private entities.  Ultimately, this Comment advocates for a 
modified Green Space Grant that allows for public and private 
cooperation. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Defining “Brownfields” and Congress’s Initial Reaction to the 
Exposure of Problematic Contaminated Properties—the Creation of 
CERCLA 
Brownfield properties are often characterized as “abandoned, idled, 
or under-used” sites.12  The federal government’s definition of a 
brownfield is “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of 
which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a 
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”13  Years of industrial 
 
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
12. Sariyah S. Buchanan, Why Marginalized Communities Should Use Community 
Benefit Agreements as a Tool for Environmental Justice: Urban Renewal and Brownfield 
Redevelopment in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 31, 36 
(2010) (quoting Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalyst for Neighborhood 
Revitalization, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2000)). 
13. Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001 
§ 211(a)(39)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006); see also Revitalizing Contaminated Sites—
Liability Protections for Owners and Prospective Purchasers, 26 HAZARDOUS WASTE 
CONSULTANT, no. 5, 2008 at 4.2 [hereinafter Revitalizing Contaminated Sites].  Properties also 
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use and contamination created numerous lots that are no longer 
environmentally safe to use—and the abandonment of these properties 
occurred, in part, because business owners left areas due to either 
economic hardship (which caused them to close shop) or increased 
suburbanization (which made developing in less-expensive outlying 
areas more attractive than developing in older urban cores).14 
America’s initial worry about contaminated property started after 
the 1978 disaster in Love Canal, New York.  A local company’s unsafe 
chemical waste disposal resulted in a “toxic soup bubbling up into the 
basements” of Love Canal houses,15 creating a “public outcry.”16  As a 
result of this misfortune, Congress enacted CERCLA to swiftly 
remediate hazardous waste sites and to ensure that responsible parties 
would be liable for costs:17 Congress intended CERCLA to clean up 
 
may be referred to as brownfields due simply to “perceived” environmental contamination 
without regard to whether environmental contamination actually exists.  John S. Applegate, 
Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields 
Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243, 246 (1997–1998).  The State of Wisconsin 
tweaks the federal definition slightly, providing that brownfields means “abandoned, idle or 
underused industrial or commercial facilities or sites, the expansion or redevelopment of 
which is adversely affected by actual or perceived environmental contamination.”  WIS. STAT. 
§ 560.13 (2009–2010) (emphasis added); see also Kris Wernstedt & Robert Hersh, Brownfields 
Redevelopment in Wisconsin: Program, Citywide, and Site-Level Studies 1 n.1 (Res. for the 
Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-53, 2003) (noting that the Wisconsin code varies somewhat 
from the federal wording).  Thus, Wisconsin’s definition unambiguously includes closed 
plants as brownfields; and the state has taken brownfields remediation efforts directed at 
curing a growing problem of closed manufacturing facilities.  For a discussion of the 
Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative, see infra Part V.A. 
14. Henry R. Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the Enemies Are Losing, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 539, 553 (2002). 
15. Michael J. Minkus, Comment, Fighting Uncertainty: Municipal Partnerships with 
Redevelopment Agencies Can Mitigate Uncertainty to Encourage Brownfield Redevelopment, 1 
GOLDEN GATE ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 278 & n.68 (2007) (quoting ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 311 (5th ed. 2006)).  The 
Hooker Chemical Company caused the Love Canal disaster.  While in operation, Hooker 
continually disposed of hazardous chemicals by burying drums in an old canal, sealing 
chemicals with clay.  Emilee Mooney Scott, Note, Bona Fide Protection: Fulfilling CERCLA’s 
Legislative Purpose by Applying Differing Definitions of ‘Disposal’, 42 CONN. L. REV. 957, 
965 (2010); Mike Brown, ‘Sealed Vault’ Effort Failed at Canal Site, NIAGARA GAZETTE, Aug. 
9, 1978, at 1A.  Afterwards, the company filled the land and sold it to a school board, and a 
school and neighborhood were constructed on and around the property.  Scott, supra, at 965.  
Some twenty years later, heavy rainfall caused the chemical soup to seep into the homes of 
neighborhood residents.  Id. 
16. Adam J. Sulkowski, There’s Gold in Them Thar Brownfields: The Legal Framework 
of Brownfield Redevelopment and Some Tips for Getting Started, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 100, 102 
(2010). 
17. CAROLE STERN SWITZER & LYNN A. BULAN, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE 
 
15 - BRUNNER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2011  11:56 AM 
2011] SHARING THE GREEN 311 
hazardous waste sites while making polluters pay for the damage.18 
Congress’s response was necessary to cure the severe problem 
exposed by Love Canal, but CERCLA’s benefits are not without 
drawbacks.19  Most notably, individuals unintentionally acquiring 
contaminated properties may incur liability when purchasing industrial 
and commercial lots and, subsequently, must spend significant funds 
cleaning the properties to avoid penalties.20  This is because the liability 
scheme under CERLCA is generally interpreted by courts to be joint 
and several, strict, and retroactive,21 creating liability potential for most 
of the parties involved in a property.22  CERCLA’s existence has scared 
away not only potentially responsible parties (PRPs) explicitly liable 
under its provisions, but also banks and investors typically willing to 
finance developments with loans.23  Despite the disincentives to 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 3–4 
(2002); Minkus, supra note 15, at 278. 
18. Scott, supra note 15, at 966–67 (describing the aim of CERCLA).  Under CERCLA, 
there are four “parties” that may incur penalties or be responsible for cleanup: 
 
(1) the current owner or operator of the facility; (2) the owner or operator of the 
facility at the time that any hazardous substances were disposed of; (3) any person 
who arranged for disposal, treatment, or transportation of hazardous substances; 
and (4) any person who transported hazardous substances to the facility. 
Id. at 967 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006)).  Essentially, past, present, and future parties are 
potentially liable even if they are not at fault.  Linda McCarthy, The Brownfield Dual Land-
Use Policy Challenge: Reducing Barriers to Private Redevelopment While Connecting Reuse to 
Broader Community Goals, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 287, 289 (2002). 
19. See, e.g., Kris Wernstedt & Robert Hersh, Brownfield Policy Reform in Wisconsin: A 
New Regulatory Culture, RESOURCES, Spring 2004, at 14. 
20. Emily A. Green, The Rustbelt and the Revitalization of Detroit: A Commentary and 
Criticism of Michigan Brownfield Legislation, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 571, 577 (2004); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(1) (2006) (indicating that current owners are subject to liability under CERCLA).  
Penalties for failing to comply with contaminated property regulations or cleanup orders can 
be large.  For example, in Wisconsin, for any violation of its Spill Statute—the statute that 
governs contaminated property liability—a party will be fined up to $5000.  WIS. STAT. 
§ 292.99(1) (2009–2010).  And each day that the property is not cleaned up is an individual 
offense.  Id.; Arthur J. Harrington, Wisconsin, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 985, 986. 
21. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878, 1881 (2009) 
(noting that an exception to joint and several liability exists if a CERCLA defendant proves 
“that a reasonable basis for apportionment exists”); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 
160, 167, 171, 173–74 (4th Cir. 1988); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 
WI 108, ¶¶ 114–15, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257; Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra 
note 13, at 4.2. 
22. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.2. 
23. Todd S. Davis, Brownfields Sites: Removing Lenders Concerns as a Barrier to 
Redevelopment, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 116, 117, 128; see also Telephone 
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redevelopment,24 which will be elaborated on in Part II.C., it is vital that 
communities understand the general reasons why brownfields 
remediation is important, including what features of urban brownfields 
may work to lure in private developers. 
B.  Why Communities Should Redevelop Brownfield Properties 
Reasons for localities and community stakeholders to redevelop 
contaminated properties go beyond environmental justice and public 
health.  Moreover, despite strong financial and liability disincentives 
posed to private parties, brownfield properties can attract private 
developers through location because many brownfields are in urban 
areas and maintain a close proximity to population centers, 
transportation, resources, and other networks.25  Redevelopment 
reasons include removing blight and its negative effects; eliminating 
eyesores; gentrifying neighborhoods; creating jobs and increasing tax 
revenue; decontaminating land; creating recreational options; and 
reversing the present insistence of industrial and commercial entities to 
develop on greenfields in outlying areas rather than land poised for 
redevelopment in urban cores.26 
 
Interview with Mark Wendorf, Dir. of Pub. Works, City of Delavan, Wis. (Jan. 10, 2011) 
(mentioning that brownfield projects “scare” banks). 
24. “‘Redevelopment’ . . . means restoring the presumed future use of the site to an 
industrial or commercial use.”  Applegate, supra note 13, at 272.  Thus, by “brownfields 
redevelopment,” I am referring to the future use of brownfield properties. 
25. Walter E. Mugdan, Environmental Considerations in Real Estate Transactions, in 
THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: BROWNFIELDS 
AND BEYOND 1665, 1667 (ALI-ABA, Course of Study, 2010) (defining location as “the 
relationship of the property to population centers, transportation, and other infrastructure, its 
proximity to necessary natural resources or materials, and to markets, etc.”).  Location is 
arguably the most important factor in real estate purchasing decisions.  Id. 
26. See Kris Wernstedt, Lisa Crooks & Robert Hersh, Brownfields Redevelopment in 
Wisconsin: A Survey of the Field 12–13 & tbl.4 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-
54, 2003); EPA Brownfields Grants of $71 Million Will Help Address Petroleum and Other 
Hazards, UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK GUIDE NEWSL. (Thompson Publ’g Group, 
Tampa, Fla.), June 2008, at 1, available at 20 No. 9 USTGUIDE-NWL 5 (Westlaw) (quoting 
Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Admin., Statement (Apr. 7, 2008)) (noting that redeveloping 
brownfields may help the removal of eyesores); More than the Environment, supra note 10 
(noting crime reduction, commercial opportunities, jobs, and property tax revenue increases).  
When I refer to “greenfields,” I am referring to undeveloped property, never used for 
commercial or economic activity.  See, e.g., Green, supra note 20, at 571–72.  This is in 
contrast to “greenspace,” which I ultimately suggest brownfields should be redeveloped into.  
Greenspace includes manufactured parks, recreational trails, civic plazas, seating areas, 
among others, but does not include undeveloped “greenfield” sites.  See, e.g., Choosing 
“Greenspace” as a Brownfields Reuse, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., 
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The most commonly considered and documented of these reasons is 
blight.27  Brownfield properties that are vacant or underused hamper 
surrounding areas with urban decay and despair28 and declining property 
values,29 potentially resulting in increased crime.30  As a whole, the 
negative consequences of blight are detrimental to the community 
health of areas where brownfields are prevalent.31 
From a financial perspective, municipalities should be especially 
concerned about blight-related declines in property values that could 
result in decreased tax revenues.32  Redeveloping brownfields into more 
attractive or more productive land could halt plummeting property 
values, which could lead to improved tax bases.33  Plus, those 
 
D.C.), Oct. 2003 [hereinafter Choosing Greenspace], available at 
http://epa.gov/brownfields/success/Green_Space.pdf. 
27. “Blight” is a very broad term.  This is demonstrated by the description of “blighted 
properties” according to the State of Michigan, which includes the following array of 
properties: 
 
(1) declared a public nuisance in accordance with a municipality’s code or 
ordinance, (2) an attractive nuisance to children, (3) are a fire hazard or otherwise 
dangerous to public safety, (4) have had the utilities, plumbing, heating, or sewerage 
permanently disconnected, destroyed, removed, or rendered ineffective so that the 
property is unfit for its intended use, (5) are tax reverted, (6) are owned by a land 
bank fast track authority, or (7) have substantial subsurface debris rendering the 
site unfit for its intended use. 
Richard A. Barr & Megan C. McCulloch, Challenging Times Call for Layered Incentives for 
Distressed Properties, 36 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 125, 128 (2009) (citing and quoting MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.2652(e) (West 2006)). 
28. Anne Marie Pippin, Community Involvement in Brownfield Redevelopment Makes 
Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in the United States and Central and 
Eastern Europe, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 596 (2009); see also Applegate, supra note 
13, at 247 (mentioning that abandoned brownfields “symbolize the hazards and hopelessness 
of the inner city”). 
29. Pippin, supra note 28, at 592. 
30. See Buchanan, supra note 12, at 32, 38 n.40; Jasleen K. Anand & Naeem Mia, 
Brownfields Development: New Tools May Be Available in Your Own Backyard, PROB. & 
PROP., Mar./Apr. 2010, at 43, 43 (suggesting that brownfield sites that are owned but 
abandoned can pose a threat to public safety). 
31. Laura L. Hunt, Reclaiming the Valley, UWM TODAY, Fall 2004, at 10–12; see also 
Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14 (“[U]nattended contaminated sites may threaten 
public health and the environment . . . .”). 
32. Buchanan, supra note 12, at 37; Catherine J. LaCroix, Urban Agriculture & Other 
Green Uses: Remaking the Shrinking City, 42 URB. LAW. 225, 229–30, 247 (2010) (indicating 
that vacant lots and buildings litter blighted areas and that these abandoned parcels 
contribute to decreased property values in surrounding areas). 
33. Dennis A. Kaufman & Norman R. Cloutier, The Impact of Small Brownfields and 
Greenspaces on Residential Property Values, 33 J. REAL EST. FIN. ECON. 19, 27–29 (2006); 
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redevelopments may stimulate development in surrounding areas.34  In 
fact, urban planning professionals insist that increasing tax revenue and 
creating jobs are two key reasons to redevelop brownfields.35  And, 
developing brownfields for financial gain—seen through job creation, 
private economic development, increased property values, or increased 
tax base and tax revenue36—is especially relevant during poor economic 
times, as the case is today.  In 2000, estimates suggested that brownfields 
redevelopment could create over 500,000 new jobs and generate 
approximately $2 million in annual tax revenue, nationwide.37 
Arguably, job and revenue-creation estimates overshadow a 
potential diverted-investment problem.38  A similar concept has been 
discussed in the context of new sports facilities, where some question the 
extent of revenue generated when a city builds a new sports facility to 
 
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields Programs Can’t 
Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 RUT. L. REV. 1075, 
1079 (1999); How Does Your Garden Grow?  Brownfields Redevelopment and Local 
Agriculture, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2009, at 3, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/local_ag.pdf (“A Philadelphia area study 
estimated that vacant land improvements result in a 30% increase in surrounding property 
values.”). 
34. See ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 356 (2000). 
35. Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh, supra note 26, at 13 tbl.4 (reporting results from a 
survey of professionals in the field).  To be sure, urban planning professionals may be biased 
in their views on the reasons to redevelop brownfields in that they may not share the same 
goals as private-practice developers.  For comparison, see DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 35, 
where the author presents a study of the reasons private-sector stakeholders think 
brownfields redevelopment is important.  According to that study, profit maximization was 
the largest motivating factor, whereas job creation and tax restoration were on the low end of 
economic reasons.  Id. at 35 tbl.2.3. 
36. See Espinosa, supra note 12, at 3. 
37. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 287 (detailing that the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
estimated in 2000 that brownfields redevelopment would create 550,000 jobs and $2.4 million 
in annual tax revenue); Brownfields Redevelopment Could Generate 575,000 Jobs, $1.9 Billion 
in Annual Revenue, Report Says, HDR CURRENT DEVS. (West, Eagan, Minn.), July 7, 2003, 
at 1, available at 31 No. CD-14 HDRCURDEV 20 (Westlaw). 
38. By diverted investment, I am referring to money that existing private entities use to 
relocate and pay taxes and salaries at a separate location within the same city—that is, money 
that was already being spent on taxes and salaries at an existing site in a city that might be 
used by the same private entity upon relocating to a newly-cleaned, more attractive space that 
was once a brownfield.  Cf. Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are They 
Economically Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. 
L. REV. 483, 512–13 (2002) (explaining “diverted entertainment spending,” which refers to 
money that citizens once spent on existing entertainment options within a city, but would shift 
to a different entertainment option if a new sports facility is built). 
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replace an old one.39  If redevelopment efforts fail to attract additional 
investment, and instead merely prompt local entities to move from one 
side of town to the other, then no new money is directly created because 
the “investments” made into the city are just being diverted across town.  
However, cities should balance this potential pitfall with the potential 
for local reinvestment and new outside investment that could result 
when blighted properties become more attractive.40  Moreover, quality 
of life improvements, through added park space and sprawl-reduction 
measures, could help some previously-decaying cities lure developers in 
from outlying areas.41 
In addition, dual benefits are possible through greenspace 
redevelopment projects that focus on recreation and public health.42  
Greenspaces, such as parks, watersheds, and forested areas, meet “clean 
property” standards and public health goals for two reasons: (1) 
greenspaces do not further contaminate land because greenspaces lack 
chemical or residue output that might seep into the ground, and (2) 
people spend “less time” on greenspaces than on other properties and, 
 
39. Parlow, supra note 38, at 512 (explaining that new sports facilities might not generate 
“any ‘new’ revenue”).  It has been argued that replacement sports facilities simply 
“maintain[] economic activity at or near its former level.”  Id. 
40. See Sara C. Galvan, Note, Rehabilitating Rehab Through State Building Codes, 115 
YALE L.J. 1744, 1757 (2006).  For comparison, in the context of new sports facilities, a city 
creates new jobs and tax revenue if the replaced arena was in a neighboring city.  See Parlow, 
supra note 38, at 541 & n.308. 
41. Pulling in companies from other, neighboring cities would create “new” jobs and tax 
revenue.  See Parlow, supra note 38, at 541 & n.308 (suggesting that the City of Los Angeles 
created “new” jobs and tax revenue by building the Staples Center because “arena-related 
events” shifted from Inglewood to Los Angeles). 
42. One example is through the production of bioswells or storm-water retention spaces.  
Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Building Livable Places: The Importance of Landscape in Urban 
Land Use, Planning, and Development, 16 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 108–09 (2008–2009). 
Milwaukee’s Stormwater Park is a prime example.  The City of Milwaukee used grant money 
to develop a park in the Menomonee Valley that works as a water cleansing facility by 
gradually cleaning storm-water run off of nearby industrial facilities before it hits the city’s 
Menomonee River.  Menomonee Valley—Stormwater Park, REMEDIATION & REDEV. 
PROGRAM (Wis. DNR, Madison, Wis.), Jan. 2009, available at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/RR827.pdf; Telephone Interview with David Misky, 
Assistant Exec. Dir.—Sec’y, Redev. Auth. of the City of Milwaukee (Dec. 28, 2010).  
Stormwater Park sits on land that was once home to the CMC Milwaukee Road Shops.  
Menomonee Valley—Stormwater Park, supra; Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra.  
Approximately 133 acres were severely contaminated, but, through numerous grants, seventy 
acres were converted to greenspace that naturally cleanses storm-water and adds to the 
beautification of the area.  Menomonee Valley—Stormwater Park, supra; Telephone 
Interview with David Misky, supra. 
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thus, are less exposed to environmental harms.43  Consequently, 
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions provide recreational options for 
neighborhoods, improved community health and lifestyle,44 and overall 
benefits that traditional redevelopment methods lack.45 
Economic gain is also possible46 if developers recognize that areas 
enhanced by attractive features are better suited for bringing in 
business;47 and the added greenspace will make surroundings 
environmentally safe.48  If adequate grants and tax incentives are 
available to offset cleanup costs, then municipally-driven greenspace 
redevelopment could enhance the prospects of local job growth and 
economic activity by removing vacant eyesores.49  Even further, 
development indirectly triggered by added greenspaces may add to the 
tax base and create jobs,50 with the new park space potentially increasing 
property values of adjacent lots as well.51  “[P]arks can be presented as 
 
43. See Applegate, supra note 13, at 271. 
44. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 559–60. 
45. See Vanessa Russell-Evans & Carl S. Hacker, Expanding Waistlines and Expanding 
Cities: Urban Sprawl and Its Impact on Obesity, How the Adoption of Smart Growth Statutes 
Can Build Healthier and More Active Communities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 79–80 (2011) 
(noting that “adding attractive green spaces [may] . . . increase recreational activity”); 
Greenspace Uses for Brownfields Properties: It Is Easy Being Green, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS 
STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), July 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Greenspace Uses], available at 
http://134.67.99.207/brownfields/success/greenspace_ss_071310.pdf (highlighting “aesthetic 
appeal, restored natural habitat, and outdoor recreational options,” as examples). 
46. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 177, 181; Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 96, 
115 (arguing that park development is a tool for urban economic health because urban parks 
create increased property values and improved consumer behavior).  Economic benefits of 
increased property values due to park proximity are likely less apparent on their face than 
more visible economic benefits from real estate projects. 
47. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 115. 
48. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 569–70. 
49. Id. at 588.  However, some will caution that greenspace in urban or blighted areas 
must not go unused or misused because this could bring adverse effects, such as criminal 
activity, and could actually advance many of the problems that greenspace initiatives often 
intend to fix.  See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 103–04. 
50. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 560.  This, of course, is a benefit that could 
take years to surface. 
51. It has long been recognized that adding park space will increase the value of adjacent 
properties.  Federal courts established this principle in condemnation and land use debates in 
the 1800s.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U.S. 611, 617 (1898) (“Whatever tends to increase 
the attractiveness of the city . . . will operate to enhance the value of the private property 
situated therein or adjacent thereto.”); Kerr v. South Park Comm’rs, 117 U.S. 379, 385–87 
(1886) (recognizing that lands adjacent to a proposed park likely received special benefits and 
increased in value as a consequence of that park prospectively being established).  Park 
developments may impact the value of property up to 2000 feet away.  DE SOUSA, supra note 
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catalysts for urban revitalization and[,] . . . [u]ltimately, America’s urban 
parks are increasingly viewed as essential for many cities in their drive 
to market their quality of life, whether for urban neighborhoods, 
commercial developments, or the city as a whole.”52 
Redeveloping brownfields may also reduce sprawl, or “low-density, 
land-consuming, automobile-dependent, haphazard, non-contiguous (or 
‘leapfrog’) development on the fringe of settled areas, often near a 
deteriorating central city or town, that intrudes into rural or other 
undeveloped areas.”53  Many suggest that the “sprawling” of America’s 
metropolitan areas is a growing problem because sprawl reduces the 
efficiency of cities and causes pollution.54  In fact, sprawl reduction is 
part of a wider community interest in curbing the brownfields problem.55 
Brownfields redevelopment and “smart-growth” principles coexist as 
ways to balance environmental protection with economic progress.56  
 
5, at 165.  In fact, one study showed that the property value of lots located near park 
developments rose roughly 80%–100% on average.  Id. at 167 (citing a 2001 study by the 
International Economic Development Council). 
52. DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 158. 
53. Timothy J. Dowling, Point/Counterpoint, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart 
Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000); see also DE SOUSA, 
supra note 5, at 26 (highlighting the characteristics of sprawl); Edward T. Canuel, Supporting 
Smart Growth Legislation and Audits: An Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Land Planning 
Theories and Tools, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 309, 310 (2005). 
54. See John Sarkis Reshwan, Crossing the Threshold of Urban Mobility and 
Redevelopment: Using Tax Allocation Districts to Develop the Atlanta Beltline, 23 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 681, 684–85 (2007) (noting that brownfields redevelopment could alleviate traffic 
congestion); Russell-Evans & Hacker, supra, note 45, at 64–65, 95–97 (noting sprawl’s impact 
on public health and community-wide amenities).  Further effects of sprawl include “real 
estate price stagnation, tax rate increases, escalating shopping center vacancy rates, and 
schools falling into disrepair.”  Canuel, supra note 53, at 312.  The idea of “school disrepair” 
strikes home with the City of Milwaukee, a brownfields haven whose public school system 
continually brandishes intolerable graduation rates and declining attendance.  See, e.g., Erin 
Richards, MPS, Voucher Students Boost Graduation Rates, JSONLINE (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/113253444.html (highlighting that the high school 
graduation rate in the Milwaukee public school system is between 60% and 70%).  Further 
research should be done to consider the effect that brownfields redevelopments and the 
coinciding fixes to local neighborhoods could have on the attractiveness and effectiveness of 
struggling urban school systems.  Indeed, a recent article suggests that school systems could 
improve if neighborhood remediation efforts attract more residents.  Julie A. Tappendorf & 
Brent O. Denzin, Turning Vacant Properties into Community Assets Through Land Banking, 
43 URB. LAW. 801, 801–02 (2011) (“[L]ocal schools benefit because they receive more 
funding when there is an increase in property owners in their school districts.”). 
55. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 288. 
56. Canuel, supra note 53, at 313–14. 
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“Sustainable development”57 ensures quality of life and opportunity for 
present and future generations.58  Communities interested in sustainable 
development and smart-growth initiatives—and, likewise, the reduction 
of sprawl—could consider redeveloping brownfields59 as a way to keep 
urban development attractive.60  Indeed, brownfields redevelopment is 
designed to meet sustainable goals if (1) the public is involved;61 (2) 
decisions are integrated with social, health, economic, and 
environmental issues; and (3) outcomes are measured in terms of smart-
growth.62 
Finally, states should not ignore the attractive features that 
brownfield properties may present to private developers.  The focus 
here is on location.63  Urban properties often have access to 
comprehensive transportation networks64 and the larger populations and 
 
57. John C. Dernbach & Scott Bernstein, Pursuing Sustainable Communities: Looking 
Back, Looking Forward, 35 URB. LAW. 495, 497 (2003) (“[S]ustainable communities are 
‘cities and towns that prosper because people work together to produce a high quality of life 
that they want to sustain and constantly improve.  They are communities that flourish because 
they build a mutually supportive, dynamic balance between social well-being, economic 
opportunity, and environmental quality.’” (quoting PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES TASK FORCE REP. 2 (1997), available at 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/PCSD/Publications/suscomm/ind_suscom.html)).  Sustainable 
property reuse is a main objective of the EPA’s Brownfields Program.  Greenspace Uses, 
supra note 45, at 3. 
58. Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 57, at 496, 528.  Building “quality of life” is one of 
the principle objectives of sustainable development.  Id. at 496. 
59. Id. at 509.  It is also seen as a way to preserve outlying greenfield and rural areas 
where development is cheaper and becoming increasingly popular.  See Choosing Greenspace, 
supra note 26 (“An estimated 4.5 acres of greenfields are preserved for every one acre of 
brownfields redeveloped.”). 
60. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14 (suggesting that not developing vacant 
brownfields may “push new development to rural or greenfield sites”). 
61. For discussions on the importance of public involvement in brownfields 
redevelopment, see infra Parts IV & VI.A. 
62. Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Development: From Individual Sites to Smart Growth, 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS, Apr. 2009, at 10287–88.  It is arguable that states 
underutilize their policy powers in forming regimes designed to trigger urban development 
rather than greenfield development in sprawled-out areas.  See Lavea Brachman, Legislating 
Sustainable Design: The Challenge of Local Control and Political Will, ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS 
& ANALYSIS, Aug. 2010, at 10740, 10740 (“As the result of either state inaction or proactive 
statutory regimes, an uneven playing field has emerged that encourages unsustainable 
development in several ways beyond the construction and design context, including 
encouraging greenfields development and sprawl over adaptive reuse, urban infill or 
brownfield redevelopment . . . .”). 
63. Applegate, supra note 13, at 248. 
64. Paul Syms, Redeveloping Brownfield Land: The Decision-Making Process, 17 J. 
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“customer bases” that exist in denser areas.65  It is likely that the 
environmental liability and cleanup costs could outweigh the “savings” 
established by obtaining an urban property.  Still, the location of urban 
brownfields could be a selling point to certain developers that desire 
attributes of denser cities. 
The reasons for communities to redevelop brownfields are plentiful.  
If financial incentives are properly in place, brownfields redevelopment 
could substantially increase jobs, tax bases, and public health, while also 
reducing crime and removing blight.  Unfortunately, strong disincentives 
dissuade development by both communities and private developers, 
which can result in neither public nor private entities realizing the 
positive benefits to redeveloping brownfield properties. 
C.  Disincentives for Private Entities and Municipalities to Redevelop 
Brownfields 
Many of the reasons for redeveloping brownfields, and the 
subsequent benefits, are never realized because extreme disincentives 
crush potential developments.  Brownfields redevelopment is expensive 
for municipalities66 and private developers.67  Private firms continually 
show concern for environmental status and even greater concern about 
potential liability.68  Notably, a 2003 survey showed that Wisconsin 
professionals involved in the field think that the high cost of cleanup is 
the primary constraint to redeveloping brownfields.69 
 
PROP. INV. & FIN. 481, 482 (1999). 
65. Id.; DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 224. 
66. Brownfields Redevelopment Could Generate 575,000 Jobs, $1.9 Billion in Annual 
Revenue, Report Says, supra note 37 (indicating that a majority of cities cite limited cleanup 
funds as the leading impediment to brownfields redevelopment). 
67. See DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 53–61; see also Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh, supra 
note 26, at 15–16 & tbl.5 (highlighting a survey result that showed “high cost of clean-up” to 
be the most selected “important” or “very important” constraint to brownfields 
redevelopment). 
68. Robertson, supra note 33, at 1108, 1118; see also Buchanan, supra note 12, at 37–38; 
Sulkowski, supra note 16, at 101 (“Three factors that have discouraged [brownfields] 
redevelopment . . . are a lack of clean-up funds, liability concerns, and a need for 
environmental assessments.”). 
69. Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh, supra note 26, at 16 tbl.5.  But see Larry Schnapf, How 
the CERCLA Notification Requirements Facilitate the Creation of Brownfields and What EPA 
Can Do to Address This Problem, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 19, 23 (2010) 
(indicating that some empirical evidence has suggested that cleanup costs are a non-factor 
because those costs represent a small fraction of a property’s redevelopment value).  
Interestingly, in the 2003 Wisconsin survey, very few respondents indicated that a lack of 
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Without environmental regulations, the disincentives might not be 
so high.  To be sure, I am not suggesting that regulations and liabilities 
should be completely ignored—but the regulations may be the main 
reason for financial burdens because of the heavy liabilities and 
penalties they impose.70  Presently, protection from liability (through 
measures like insurance), cleanup requirements, and the unavoidable 
delay in production by attempting to satisfy current law create 
burdensome costs.71  Arguably, loosening the present requirements and 
liabilities could facilitate redevelopment through reduced expenses.72 
Recall that liability under CERCLA is joint and several, strict, and 
retroactive.73  CERCLA’s overall severity was eased when the 
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 created the 
PRP right to contribution,74 but many developers are still frightened 
away by the heavy standards and potential litigation costs.75  Certain 
 
cooperation between the public and private sector was an issue.  Wernstedt, Crooks & Hersh, 
supra, at 16 tbl.5.  This suggests that public–private cooperation may be feasible. 
70. Applegate, supra note 13, at 243–44 (mentioning that environmental regulation has a 
lot to do with the unattractiveness of developing brownfield properties); Larry Schnapf, 
Playing Poker with Pollution: Why It Is Time to Change the CERCLA Reporting Obligations, 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2011, at 8, 9 (“The conventional narrative has been that 
CERCLA liability has led to the creation of brownfields because purchasers and lenders were 
concerned about remediation costs.”).  The reason for high costs associated with brownfields 
cleanup likely stems far beyond the CERCLA regulations though.  See Schnapf, supra, at 9.  
Some even argue that a lack of reporting requirements may have as much to do with the high 
costs and concerns as the regulations.  See id. (suggesting that limited reporting requirements 
allow property owners to abandon sites without contributing to remediation). 
71. Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 283 (1997). 
72. Applegate, supra note 13, at 247.  But see Buchanan, supra note 12, at 41 (arguing 
that one risk of relaxed liability standards is taking away the ability of adversely affected 
parties to achieve recourse against wrongdoing developers).  Some even believe that legal 
barriers to implementing green infrastructure should be removed.  Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, 
Siting Green Infrastructure: Legal and Policy Solutions to Alleviate Urban Poverty and 
Promote Healthy Communities, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 41, 66 (2010) (“[I]t is essential 
for our legal systems to remove barriers to green infrastructure implementation, for 
regulators and enforcers to promote its acceptance, and for public advocates and policy 
makers to embrace its incorporation into urban design and planning, particularly in distressed 
communities.”). 
73. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 21; Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, 
at 4.2. 
74. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f) (2006); Pippin, supra note 28, at 595 (recognizing that The Superfund Amendment 
& Reauthorization Act of 1986 eased the liability prevalence and severity imposed by 
CERCLA). 
75. See Pippin, supra note 28, at 595. 
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purchasers may be shielded from liability, but any protection from 
CERCLA is hard to come by.76  State-specific mini-Superfund laws 
create CERCLA-like liability and financing detriments;77 thus, financial 
disincentives can be a product of both state laws and federal regulations. 
Creditors are hesitant to fund brownfield projects as well.  Because 
of the risks associated with brownfields, it may be difficult to secure 
outside financing for a project.78  Lenders are affected by environmental 
regulations because of the potential responsibility for cleanup or toxic 
tort costs,79 the harm that association with poor properties could bring to 
their reputations as creditors, and the risk of losing payments because a 
debtor-developer’s need to fund liability debts may restrict their ability 
to meet the lender’s loan obligations.80  Even further, because of their 
 
76. See generally Larry Schnapf, Counseling the Client on the CERCLA Windfall Lien, 
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 2004.  CERCLA traditionally provided defenses only upon 
acts of God, acts of war, or third-party acts or omissions.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2006).  
CERCLA amendments created a few new defenses for the following entities: (1) bona fide 
prospective purchasers (BFPP), (2) contiguous property owners, and (3) innocent 
landowners.  Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 21.  For example, the BFPP defense allows certain 
landowners that were aware of contamination to be free of liability if they meet certain 
criteria, such as if they took appropriate contamination inquiries and were not affiliated with 
parties that were responsible for the contamination.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2006); see also 
Schnapf, supra, at 39–40 (arguing that it is appropriate for BFPP’s that conduct adequate 
inquiries to avoid responsibility for response costs).  However, even with BFPP status, the 
EPA will capture any increase in property value gained due to EPA-funded cleanup actions.  
Schnapf, supra, at 48. 
77. Abrams, supra note 71, at 284, 287. 
78. See Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23, during which the 
interviewee insisted that banks are simply frightened by brownfields redevelopment projects 
and suggested that many redevelopment projects, especially during the recession, cannot get 
off the ground because private investors cannot secure bank financing. 
79. Lenders risk liability for costs associated with environmental cleanup if they 
participate in the managerial operations of a “vessel or facility” causing contamination or by 
exercising decisionmaking control over a vessel or facility’s environmental matters.  See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(E)–(F), 9607(a)(1) (2006); Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 23.  However, a 
lender not participating in management will not be held out as a PRP.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(2)(E); Matthew H. Ahrens & David S. Langer, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: 
Environmental Risks for Lenders Under Superfund: A Refresher for the Economic Downturn, 
3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 482, 483, 484 (2008).  See Ahrens & Langer, supra, at 485–88, for a 
breakdown of what it means to “participate in management.” 
80. Lawrence P. Schnapf, Lender Liability Today Under Environmental Laws, 60 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 147, 147 (2006); Alexander Maro, Note, Outsourcing the Filth: 
Privatizing Brownfield Remediation in New Jersey, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 159, 168 
(2011) (“[L]enders are less likely to lend money to developers for two distinct reasons: the 
inability for a lender to foreclose on a polluted property used as collateral in a secured 
transaction, and the general disinterest in lending to developers that have the potential to be 
driven into bankruptcy during a forced [transaction].”).  In 2003, one out of every ten banks 
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fear of working with contaminated properties, banks will exercise 
greater caution with properties that are simply near brownfields.81 
Location may also be a disincentive—even in light of the benefits 
that were described in Part II.B.  Many developers might rather use a 
greenfield site in the outskirts.  Higher urban tax rates and property 
values push private investment to the fringe of older industrial cities, so 
developing on a brownfield rather than a greenfield likely requires a 
very high return on profit to be worthwhile.82  One study shows that 
greenfield developments incur higher maintenance and operating costs 
than brownfield developments in just two areas: transportation and 
infrastructure.83  However, overall cleanup can push brownfields 
redevelopment costs to $100,000 more than greenfield development 
costs for the same project.84  The urban infrastructure or transportation 
 
experienced losses due to environmental issues with almost 75% occurring because of 
contaminated properties.  Schnapf, supra, at 147–48.  Lenders are not automatically PRPs and 
CERCLA affords liability protection to lenders, id. at 148, but this does not protect lenders 
from their own risky investments and money lost because debtors failed to meet obligations, 
see Robertson, supra note 33, at 1085–86, 1088 (“Lenders worry about the potential 
devaluation of a contaminated property, as well as the impact that property may have on the 
borrower’s financial stability. . . .  [While b]rownfields are ‘uncontrollable’ because the 
associated risks are imposed and controlled by ‘others’ . . . .”). 
81. Davis, supra note 23, at 117.  “As lending institutions learned more about Superfund 
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s they stayed away in droves from association with any 
brownfields property.”  Mugdan, supra note 25, at 1675. 
82. Richmond, supra note 14, at 556; see also B. Robert Amjad & Adam Fishman, 
Acquisition Considerations for Brownfields Properties, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 68, 
72 (suggesting that the need for riskier brownfields redevelopments to have higher rates of 
return than greenfield developments is comparable to how corporate bonds require higher 
rates of return than government bonds). 
83. Abrams, supra note 71, at 278 tbl.1, 284 (indicating that transportation and 
infrastructure costs generally could be less with brownfields redevelopment than with 
greenfield development, but mentioning that a “brownfields redevelopment will almost 
invariably be more costly” despite this).  Abrams comes to this conclusion without 
recognizing that existing infrastructure will likely be dilapidated and potentially must be torn 
down at an expensive price. 
84. See LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 9:33 
(2010) (noting that on average it takes $250,000 to clean up a brownfield site); Abrams, supra 
note 71, at 280 (noting that “the cost differential for large projects is beyond the ‘several 
thousand dollar per acre’ range”); Christopher De Sousa, Brownfield Redevelopment Versus 
Greenfield Development: A Private Sector Perspective on the Costs and Risks Associated with 
Brownfield Redevelopment in the Greater Toronto Area, 43 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 831, 
841–43 & tbls.5–6 (2000) (finding, in a hypothetical cost-comparison of industrial and 
residential developments on equally sized brownfield and greenfield properties, that 
development costs were always higher with brownfields); Robertson, supra note 33, at 1089–
90 (highlighting one developer that spent $225,000 for site preparation for a project that 
would have only cost $40,000 in site prep at a greenfield location). 
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savings are often trumped by impending liability and cleanup costs, so, 
given the number of other categories to consider, it is unlikely that these 
two categories could persuade a developer to use a brownfield rather 
than a greenfield.85 
Even further, the procedural considerations for remediating 
brownfields can be overbearing.  Procedural considerations include the 
end use of the property; the information on past uses and potential 
contamination; the availability of liability protections, such as the BFPP 
protection; the level of government to consult about cleanup; the state 
tools, incentives, programs, or grants that may be needed or could be 
used; and the level of involvement by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) or relevant state agency.86 
With a plethora of disincentives, it is important to consider ways to 
make brownfields redevelopment more attractive.  Doing so first 
requires an understanding of what CERCLA-fixes have already been 
implemented or contemplated. 
III.  FEDERAL AND STATE ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE DISINCENTIVES 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE COOPERATION 
Creative and innovative ways to spur brownfields redevelopment are 
required to combat the present financial disincentives.  This Part first 
addresses the primary federal fixes to redevelopment problems that 
relate to CERCLA.  It then briefly discusses some common methods to 
cure brownfields issues that states have implemented or contemplated 
and ultimately points out some innovative methods that are less 
established. 
A.  Federal Involvement Through the Brownfields Act and the EPA 
One of the first federal maneuvers to redirect the brownfields 
problem was the 1994 Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Initiative 
(BERI).87  This initiative offered certain developers grant money and 
attempted to lure industrial developers away from rural development 
sites and back to the urban core.88  However, BERI, while still existing, 
 
85. Abrams, supra note 71, at 278 tbl.1 (mentioning other categories, including land cost, 
debris removal, taxes, insurance, and zoning). 
86. See Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.1. 
87. Pippin, supra note 28, at 597. 
88. Press Release, U.S. EPA, NTC Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative 
(Nov. 9, 1994), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ee765cb97fbff562852572a000651fdf 
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never provided enough to effectively move redevelopment forward in 
light of CERCLA.89 
Far more successful was The Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act (Small Business Act), enacted by 
Congress in 2001, which includes the Brownfields Revitalization and 
Environmental Restoration Act (Brownfields Act).90  These Acts 
focused on fixing certain CERCLA shortcomings that prevented 
successful brownfields redevelopment.91  The Brownfields Act provided 
more financing and liability relief to parties involved in cleanup,92 with 
financing occurring in three ways: (1) grants for environmental 
assessments, (2) grants to establish a revolving loan-fund at the state or 
local level, and (3) cleanup awards.93 
Administratively, the EPA maintains grants for those seeking site 
assessment and cleanup support.94  However, obtaining an EPA grant is 
very competitive.95  The EPA also maintains a National Priorities List 
(NPL) through which it facilitates cleanup efforts and assesses liability 
 
/8187e49f2a3507248525646d007742be!OpenDocument. 
89. Id.  BERI’s ineffectiveness could be because of its strict requirements.  Proposed 
projects had to present the following: 
 
[A] demonstrated commitment of public and private leadership to brownfields 
redevelopment; plans for effective community involvement; a clear delineation of 
how federal support will make a significant difference; a potential for national 
replication; local government support and technical, legal and political capacity to 
complete goals; clearly outlined potential sources of cleanup funding; contributions 
to environmental justice goals; and a well-defined approach to environmental 
assessment. 
Id.  
90. See Pub. L. No. 107-118, §§ 201–231, 115 Stat. 2360, 2360–81 (2002). 
91. See id.; Minkus, supra note 15, at 279–80; Pippin, supra note 28, at 599. 
92. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 15 (explaining that the Brownfields Act 
provided $200 million annually for site assessment and cleanup grants and $50 million for 
state programs).  However, the Brownfields Act deflected much of the remediation control to 
state voluntary cleanup programs.  Maro, supra note 80, at 170. 
93. Pippin, supra note 28, at 599.  Private entities could receive up to $200,000, whereas 
municipalities could be awarded up to $1 million.  Id. 
94. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.9 tbl.2. 
95. LEVERAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2.  Brownfields 
redevelopment funding is also obtainable through the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD).  Id.  In fact, $17.5 million in funding was available for 2010 through 
HUD’s Brownfield Economic Development Initiative.  BEDI Quick Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOUSING AND URB. DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/economicdevelopment/programs/
bedi/bedifacts.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
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for the most problematic properties.96  However, an abundance of “less 
contaminated” properties are still liable under CERCLA despite not 
being on the NPL.97  As a whole, state initiatives are necessary to service 
the hundreds of thousands of less contaminated sites. 
B.  State and Local Measures 
The majority of brownfields initiatives, provisions, and supports are 
state specific.98  States have adopted their own “Superfund” plans,99 and 
have become increasingly creative in finding ways to cure brownfield 
problems. 
The most popular state-created support systems are voluntary 
cleanup programs (VCP).100  These are state-funded programs that work 
to limit developer liability and provide incentives for private 
development, such as loans and grants.101  VCPs often have secondary 
objectives, such as curtailing sprawl,102 and are directed at sites with 
lower contamination or risk levels that are not Superfund-eligible.103 
 
96. For basic information on the NPL, see National Priorities List (NPL), U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
97. Pippin, supra note 28, at 591, 595 (indicating that there are roughly 500,000 
brownfield properties throughout the country and very few reach the contamination levels 
necessary for inclusion on the National Priorities List for subsequent Superfund support).  
The NPL’s “Superfund” list contains only the most contaminated brownfields and in 2002 
contained between 1000 and 1500 of the estimated over 500,000 brownfield sites existing at 
that time.  McCarthy, supra note 18, at 287. 
98. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14; Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 21 
(indicating that a “tenet” of brownfields amendments has been that states should spearhead 
brownfields remediation efforts). 
99. Abrams, supra note 71, at 287 (indicating though that state-specific Superfund plans 
can be just as burdensome and difficult to work with as CERCLA). 
100. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 11 (mentioning that over forty-five states have 
implemented voluntary cleanup programs, up from thirty in 1997); McCarthy, supra note 18, 
at 290 (mentioning that by 2002 more than forty-five states had “voluntary action programs”); 
Daniel Schlesinger, Comment, Revisiting New York’s Brownfield Cleanup Program: An 
Analysis of a Voluntary Cleanup Program that Lost Its Way, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 403, 408 
(2010) (noting most states have created their own voluntary cleanup programs); Wernstedt & 
Hersh, supra note 19, at 15 (“All but a handful [of states] have developed formal voluntary 
cleanup or brownfield programs that operate in a less burdensome and more voluntary 
fashion to proactively encourage redevelopment.”). 
101. Canuel, supra note 53, at 342–43. 
102. See, e.g., id. (noting that one objective of a Maryland act that contained a voluntary 
cleanup program was to reduce sprawl). 
103. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.3–4.4; Maro, supra note 80, at 
171 (noting that New Jersey’s voluntary cleanup program is designed for sites not on 
Superfund’s priority list). 
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Another popular method is tax incremental financing (TIF).104  
Through TIF plans, subsequent tax revenue increases that are triggered 
by private developments are sent to developers to help pay off any debt 
incurred by their projects.105  The local government would designate an 
area for development while using subsequent rises in property taxes to 
pay off its own previous investments or pay back private investors.106  
However, TIF plans fail unless area property values increase or adjacent 
development is triggered because, without property values moving up or 
new investment moving in, the municipality funding the TIF never 
increases its ability to generate tax revenue at a higher rate.107 
An additional, fairly routine form of assistance is environmental 
insurance.108  Using environmental insurance relieves uncertainty over 
cleanup costs,109 and environmental-specific insurance policies, called 
Contamination Legal Liability policies, have reduced remediation 
costs.110  However, the insurance method is still less utilized than TIFs 
and VCPs, and often is an expensive protection.  Further, many factors 
 
104. Minkus, supra note 15, at 301; see also Barr & McCulloch, supra note 27, at 128 
(noting that TIF districts are the main brownfields weapon in Michigan). 
105. Canuel, supra note 53, at 316 & n.40.  “A TIF plan allows a local unit of 
government to freeze the amount of assessed property values in an underdeveloped or 
distressed area that is retained by that local unit, and apply any increases in property tax 
revenues due to increases in value to finance [area] improvement projects . . . .”  Laura M. 
Bassett, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Redevelopment: Attracting Private Investment 
to Serve a Public Purpose—The Example of Michigan, 41 URB. LAW. 755, 757 (2009).  TIF 
plans used to be limited to blighted areas, but now are more widely available.  See WIS. STAT. 
§ 66.1105(4)(gm)(4)(bm) (2009–2010) (indicating that in Wisconsin, “the project costs [must] 
relate directly to eliminating blight, directly serve to rehabilitate or conserve the area or 
directly serve to promote industrial development”).  Now, TIFs are generally intended for 
areas that have been unable to attract private development.  Bassett, supra, at 763.  Even 
further, TIF plans have been recognized as promoting a public purpose.  Id. at 757, 769–70, 
774–76 (“The use of TIF funds to finance these improvements . . . arguably promotes the 
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality under the generally recognized definition 
of public purpose.”).  Michigan courts previously held that preparing land for economic 
development and working to enhance tax bases are community actions that have public 
purposes.  See City of Mt. Pleasant v. State Tax Comm’n, 729 N.W.2d 833, 835–36, 38 (Mich. 
2007). 
106. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 17. 
107. See Bassett, supra note 105, at 759 (highlighting that TIF plans rely on increases in 
property values). 
108. Minkus, supra note 15, at 291–93; Arthur J. Harrington, Environmental Insurance: 
A Business Lawyer’s Guide, WIS. LAW., May 2007, at 14, 14, 16. 
109. William McElroy & Todd S. Davis, Environmental Insurance in the Brownfields 
Transaction, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 155, 157. 
110. Harrington, supra note 108, at 14, 16–17, 58–60. 
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affect the “utility” of environmental insurance, “including the types of 
coverage available, the dollar limits on claims, the policy time limits, site 
assessment requirements, and costs for available products.”111  While 
environmental insurance is encouraged, the procedure to obtain it can 
be complex.112 
Lastly, a simple inventory of brownfield sites accelerates the cleanup 
process by making brownfields easier to identify.113  Milwaukee 
maintains a directory of tax-delinquent brownfields on the city’s 
website, but lacks a complete inventory of the many contaminated 
properties it hosts.114  A legislative mandate that requires municipalities 
to maintain brownfields inventories could improve risk communication 
and reduce delays in decisionmaking.115  Inventories could be 
particularly helpful for less contaminated sites where environmental 
issues may be less recognizable116 and for providing the public with 
better access to information.117 
Many insist that the key to successful brownfields redevelopment is 
balancing the state and environmentalist interests with developer 
interests.118  This entails balancing environmental health interests, 
including cleaner commerce and industry, with developer interests in 
cost-conscious and efficient development.  To meet this balance, a 
growing number of state-specific initiatives attempt to incorporate all or 
 
111. Revitalizing Contaminated Sites, supra note 13, at 4.8.  But see McElroy & Davis, 
supra note 109, at 161 (mentioning that environmental insurance has become more affordable 
since the late 1990s); Tellier et al., supra note 4, at 26 (“The role of insurance in [b]rownfields 
development has increased significantly in recent years . . . .”). 
112. Wisconsin has statutorily created an environmental insurance option for 
developers.  WIS. STAT. § 292.53 (2009–2010).  The Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (WDNR) provides a walk-through of the complex application and qualification 
process, which requires costly phase one and phase two environmental assessments as 
prerequisites.  Wisconsin Brownfields Insurance Program, WIS. DNR, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/wbip.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
113. Seth Schofield, In Search of the Institution in Institutional Controls: The Failure of 
the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 and the Need for 
Federal Legislation, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 946, 1015–16 (2005). 
114. Brownfields Redevelopment Site Inventory, CITY OF MILWAUKEE: DEP’T OF CITY 
DEV., http://www.mkedcd.org/brownfields/bfsites.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
115. Schofield, supra note 113, at 1016; Schnapf, supra note 69, at 19.  Some suggest that 
CERCLA could require reporting by placing a “mandatory obligation on property owners to 
investigate suspected releases and disclose the existence of contamination that exceeds 
unrestricted cleanup standards.”  Schnapf, supra, at 22. 
116. See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 289–90. 
117. See generally Schnapf, supra note 69. 
118. Minkus, supra note 15, at 272–73. 
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some of the methods described above.119  If brownfield properties could 
be more attractive with subsidized costs or more information,120 then it is 
important for state initiatives to take creative and broad-based 
approaches that support public and private, community-specific, 
cooperation. 
C.  Creative Use of Public–Private Partnerships 
The best way to facilitate brownfields redevelopment may be for 
public and private entities to work together through public–private 
partnerships (PPPs).  Municipalities with available resources often opt 
to cleanup brownfield sites,121 so they could use these resources to find 
ways to work with private developers to create coordination.122  One 
contemplated measure has been for municipalities and private 
developers to share liability or profits.123  Others insist on a PPP whereby 
a municipality provides funds for public-use developments coordinated 
with outside parties who construct infill projects at adjacent properties.124  
 
119. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & M. Katherine Kraft, Editor’s Note, Active Living, 
the Built Environment, and the Policy Agenda, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 371, 379 (2008) 
(describing Boston’s “Boston Schoolyard Initiative,” which is meant to transform old and 
unused Boston area schoolyards into usable greenspace); Laura Carstens, Defining, Inspiring, 
and Implementing Sustainability, NAT’L CIVIC REV., Fall 2010, at 12–15 (describing Dubuque, 
Iowa’s “Sustainable Dubuque Initiative”); More than the Environment, supra note 10 
(describing Omaha, Nebraska’s “‘Back to the River’ initiative,” which seeks to transform 
Omaha’s riverfront into a sustainable area that includes common spaces, an office park, and a 
corporate headquarters); infra Part V.A. 
120. Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 17 (“[T]ens of thousands of properties 
around the country would be substantially more attractive if cleanup costs were subsidized or, 
in some cases, just known with greater certainty.”). 
121. Schofield, supra note 113, at 1013–14. 
122. D. Evan van Hook et al., The Challenge of Brownfield Clusters: Implementing a 
Multi-Site Approach for Brownfield Remediation and Reuse, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 142–
43 (2003) (arguing that synergies between stakeholders are important to the success of 
brownfields redevelopment and coordination between public and private financing is 
encouraged).  Moreover, from a private financing standpoint, when “private parties work in a 
partnership with the public sector” it may also be easier to purchase insurance.  Id. at 151. 
123. Minkus, supra note 15, at 269, 315–16; see also Letter from Barry Trilling, Partner, 
Wiggin & Dana LLP, to Peter Meyer, Dir., Ctr. for Envtl. Policy & Mgmt., Univ. of Louisville 
(Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://www.cpeo.org/lists/brownfields/2006/msg00473.html 
(suggesting both public and private sectors should participate in brownfields redevelopment 
through publicly funded incentive programs that would encourage private developer 
involvement). 
124. LEVERAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2.  Local circumstances are 
often as important to brownfields redevelopment as environmental or cost elements.  
Espinosa, supra note 12, at 30.  Moreover, the idea of “public approval” of brownfields 
redevelopment has already been contemplated and is encouraged for the master planning of 
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Whether a PPP could aid in the ownership process is less understood, 
but two less-used redevelopment tactics, explained below, make public–
private cooperation a focus throughout the remediation process. 
The first is the multi-site approach.  Typically, brownfields 
redevelopment is done on a parcel-by-parcel basis.125  This may be 
because states require tight regulation and encourage parcel-specific 
cleanups due to the varied chemicals and waste existing at different, 
even adjacent, properties.126  But, redeveloping brownfields in clusters 
could add efficiency to the process, pull in more stakeholders, and 
provide greater public value if the properties were coordinated during 
cleanup.127  Could states implement programs where municipalities and 
private entities share in development and use grants not otherwise 
available to private parties, while ensuring an ongoing, coordinated, 
 
cities and general public awareness.  Pippin, supra note 28, at 604–05.  See generally Daniel S. 
Wilson & Tara A. Butler, The New Market Frontier: Unlocking Community Capitalism 
Through Brownfields Redevelopment, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 229–30.  Thus, any 
brownfields redevelopment effort by a private entity would be better accomplished by 
cooperation between private developers, local authorities, and the public at large.  Though 
not related to public–private partnerships, those researching brownfields in Milwaukee have 
suggested using public funding for “market-driven” brownfields redevelopment in locations 
that will generate the greatest property tax benefit per unit of public investment.  See 
Christopher A. De Sousa et al., Assessing the Effect of Publicly Assisted Brownfield 
Redevelopment on Surrounding Property Values, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 95, 95, 108 (2009) 
(speculating that such an approach could lead to property tax increases through large and 
small-scale brownfields redevelopment efforts). 
125. Eisen, supra note 62, at 10285.  Not only can this be tenuous for prospective 
developers and communities, but it is not in line with smart-growth principles.  See id. 
126. For example, David Misky of the Redevelopment Authority of the City of 
Milwaukee (RACM) mentions that it may be easier for the City of Milwaukee to assess, test, 
and clean adjacent brownfield properties together, but because of varied environmental 
issues at each site, the WDNR generally ensures that cleanup is done on a parcel-by-parcel 
basis.  Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra note 42.  The City of Delavan, 
Wisconsin, tried to test and clean on a multi-site basis, but it was unable to do so because, due 
to varied environmental issues and ownership problems at each site, a multi-site approach 
was not feasible under Wisconsin’s standards.  See Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, 
supra note 23.  Site-investigations in Wisconsin require the submission of a detailed work plan 
that requires specific data for each site.  See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 716.09 (current through 
669 Wis. Admin. Reg. (Oct., 1 2011)). 
127. Van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 114; see also Sulkowski, supra note 16, at 110–11 
(arguing that “holistic” approaches are best for all stakeholders because brownfields 
redevelopments often fail for non-environmental reasons and local issues).  Moreover, parcel-
by-parcel approaches lack the ability to attack the social and aesthetic problems in areas that 
contain large swaths of open land because, with individual-site remediation focuses, 
developers are often too fixated on the financials of an individual property rather than the 
rejuvenation of an entire blighted community.  Maro, supra note 80, at 173–74. 
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cross-property focus through the life of the redeveloped parcels?128  
Successful brownfields redevelopment requires flexibility,129 so if multi-
site coordination can reduce cleanup costs by such measures as sharing 
mobile testing labs and simultaneous land investigations, Wisconsin and 
other states should consider using a multi-site approach to better 
facilitate cleanup.130 
Second, northwestern European countries are experimenting with 
public involvement in ways that are unique to many American 
redevelopment attempts.131  According to some, the “western” model to 
brownfields redevelopment involves public participation,132 but it seems 
that Europe is in reality being more innovative with this concept.  
Recognizing that public–private models are “creative way[s] to realize 
public projects with private involvement in developing, building, 
financing, maintaining and/or operating in order to add value to the 
benefit of the whole project,”133 some northwestern European countries 
have placed creative spins on PPPs.  One such cooperative measure is 
the “alliance,” where mutual operation of brownfields redevelopment 
sites is maintained in the long-term and not just the cleanup process.134  
 
128. See van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 118. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 134–35; Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 17 (“[A]n areawide approach 
could promise a high enough increase in property values to make it attractive for property 
owners, prospective purchasers, and developers to invest in remediation and 
redevelopment . . . .”). 
131. See generally M.B. GLASER, PPP AND BROWNFIELD REVITALISATION SITES IN 
NORTH-WEST EUROPE (2005), available at http://www.revitnweurope.org/selfguidingtrail/20_ 
PPP_and_Brownfield_Revitalisation_Sites_in_NorthWest_Europe.pdf. 
132. Pippin, supra note 28, at 593. 
133. GLASER, supra note 131, at 10. 
134. Id. at 15; see also WORLD BANK, EUR. AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. DEP’T, THE MANAGEMENT OF BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: A 
GUIDANCE NOTE 39 (2010) (“A PPP alliance, ideally, fosters a close cooperation between 
the public and private side through all stages of the redevelopment process, including risk 
sharing and financing.”).  In Nantes, France, the redevelopment of contaminated land 
included an alliance approach.  See GLASER, supra note 131, at 15, 35 & fig.19.  The City of 
Nantes and private investors are sharing in the development of part of the Ile de Nantes in 
the form of a PPP alliance.  Id. at 35 fig.19.  The PPP is owned 61% by the City of Nantes and 
39% by private investors and has a life span of twenty years.  Id.  After completion of the 
redevelopment, maintenance is shared.  Id.  As a whole, the public areas remain public 
whereas PPP designated areas are controlled by the PPP.  Id.  The PPP purchases the land, 
designates public spaces, and may designate land to sell; but these decisions are all made 
based on the 61% to 39% public–private ownership split.  See id. at 66–68.  Ultimately, the 
city believes that by taking on more risk in cleanup efforts it can better attract economic 
development; but the city is comfortable with this because part of the PPP model involves 
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Through an alliance, private entities might find brownfields projects 
more feasible because they would be able to get guidance from 
municipalities by way of funding otherwise available only if 
municipalities owned and operated the redeveloped property.  That is, 
an alliance method allows private entities to take advantage of funding 
mechanisms not ordinarily at their disposal. 
Despite the creative methods available to remediate brownfields, the 
number of contaminated properties across the country continues to rise.  
In Wisconsin, the number of closed plants has increased in recent 
years.135  The economy is likely a large factor for the increase, but the 
fact that these properties will sit vacant for a long time, in large part 
because of their contaminated state, is startling.  Relaxing brownfields 
regulations and redevelopment standards could promote economic 
development while still preventing environmental problems—the two 
primary cleanup objectives.136  Standards should not only be read as 
“liability invoking,” but also as the rules that guide funding and 
procedural mechanisms of designated ways to actually obtain assistance 
to properly cleanup and put to productive use contaminated 
properties.137 
What each method described above shows is that when communities 
and private parties redevelop brownfields in conjunction, more options 
are created.  Community involvement ensures that environmental 
justice goals are met,138 which is important because applicants from less 
 
added public space and greenspace.  Id. at 68.  Thus far, rejuvenation efforts include the 
development of civic buildings, university additions, and commercial offices.  See ANDREW 
GRAY, ILE DE NANTES: FESTIVAL ON INDUSTRIAL HERITAGE (2007), available at 
http://www.revit-nweurope.org/selfguidingtrail/13_Ile_de_Nantes_festival_on_industrial_ 
heritage.pdf. 
135. See Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR, Presentation at 2010 
Wis. Am. Planning Conf. 14 (May 5, 2010) [hereinafter Presentation at 2010 Wis. Planning 
Conf.], available at http://www.wisconsinplanners.org/attachments/presentations2010/Conque
ringBrownfieldsDNR.pdf; Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR, 
Redevelopment and Reuse: Conquering Brownfields, Presentation 19 [hereinafter 
Redevelopment and Reuse] (on file with author). 
136. See Applegate, supra note 13, at 284–85.  But see McCarthy, supra note 18, at 290 
(warning us of the risks of relaxed brownfields regulatory standards by highlighting 27,200 
contaminated sites that may have been “archived” without “adequate environmental site 
assessments” after more leeway was given for the assessment of those sites). 
137. See Applegate, supra note 13, at 284–85. 
138. Lincoln L. Davies, Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of 
Brownfields Redevelopment in Environmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
285, 288, 316 (1999). 
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wealthy communities are often ignored.139  Yet, partnership approaches 
could alleviate risk to less experienced developers, who are reluctant to 
dive into the brownfields market.140  Thus, forming a team of public and 
private influence that is willing to be innovative is imperative. 
IV.  MUNICIPAL–PRIVATE COOPERATION TO PROMOTE 
GREENSPACE DEVELOPMENT 
Municipality-based brownfields redevelopment options are superior 
to those for private entities because municipalities have better access to 
federal and state funding awards.141  Furthermore, municipalities incur 
less liability and fewer penalties for owning contaminated property, are 
exempt in more ways than private entities from incurring liability after 
acquiring a contaminated property, and often incur far less cost than 
private entities during redevelopment.142  Perhaps then, municipalities 
can use these advantages to aid private redevelopment efforts through a 
partnership setting. 
The cost of brownfields redevelopment makes the conversion 
process contingent on help from the government.143  Brownfields grant 
programs that encourage and fund greenspace conversions are more 
widely available to municipalities than private entities—yet, greenspace 
redevelopment projects are often passed over.144  In fact, among 
remediation “success stories” highlighted by the Wisconsin Department 
of Natural Resources (WDNR), only four projects received funding 
through Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant—a program that I will describe 
 
139. Matthew Dull & Kris Wernstedt, Land Recycling, Community Revitalization, and 
Distributive Politics: An Analysis of EPA Brownfields Program Support, 38 POL’Y STUD. J. 
119, 134, 136 (2010). 
140. Redevelopment and Reuse, supra note 135, at 22 (“The more experienced 
developers consider brownfields management as just another aspect of development. . . .  
While those with less tend to react more cautiously, but are willing to do it again.” (quoting 
Chris De Sousa)). 
141. See, e.g., Dull & Wernstedt, supra note 139, at 134 (noting local governments are 
more likely to receive brownfields redevelopment support); Telephone Interview with 
Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR (Jan. 6, 2011). 
142. See Minkus, supra note 15, at 301. 
143. Brown & Kraft, supra note 119, at 381. 
144. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 562 & n.3 (noting that brownfield-to-
greenspace conversions account for 5% of all brownfield redevelopment projects).  This is 
despite recognition by the EPA that brownfield programs should not just be created for 
facilitating taxable development, but also for adding greenspace.  See EPA Brownfields 
Grants of $71 Million Will Help Address Petroleum and Other Hazards, supra note 26. 
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thoroughly in Part V.145 
Greenspace redevelopment should not be an afterthought.  Because 
transforming brownfields into greenspace takes taxable land off of the 
market, thus removing land that could potentially increase a 
municipality’s tax base,146 brownfield-to-greenspace conversions may be 
looked at as development that restricts rather than encourages 
economic activity (and that would be especially difficult in today’s 
economic climate).147  However, for numerous reasons, the benefits of 
mixing greenspace redevelopment efforts into community 
redevelopment are not only plentiful on the public health front,148 but 
significant from an economic standpoint as well. 
Greenspace developments can be tools for economic urban health149 
that provide the “positive economic impacts [of] increasing property 
values and bringing people to local businesses.”150  Property values 
increase with proximity to parks, while parks can increase tourism, 
which can expand local economies in size and scope.151  Further, the high 
cost of financing parks is potentially offset by the sale of adjacent land 
 
145. Remediation and Redevelopment Program Success Stories, WIS. DNR, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/cleanup/sstories.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) [hereinafter 
Remediation & Redevelopment Success Stories].  Though brownfield-to-greenspace projects 
are becoming more popular, as recent as 2008, this form of redevelopment compromised less 
than 5% of U.S. brownfield projects.  DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 155. 
146. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 565.  Further, greenspace can be a fiscal 
drain because municipalities and their taxpayers ultimately fund park spaces.  William W. 
Buzbee, Sprawl’s Political-Economy and the Case for a Metropolitan Green Space Initiative, 
32 URB. LAW. 367, 386 (2000). 
147. See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 293 (suggesting that any requirement concerning 
future use of property could restrict profit opportunities that a community might otherwise 
have available). 
148. Applegate, supra note 13, at 271 (suggesting that greenspaces pose less risk to 
individuals because people spend less time on greenspaces than elsewhere); Timothy Beatley, 
Biophilic Urbanism: Inviting Nature Back to Our Communities and into Our Lives, 34 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 209, 212 (2009) (recognizing that greenspace added to 
communities can boost individual mood, health, and performance). 
149. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 42, at 96. 
150. Anna Read & Isabel Fernandez, Integrated Greenspace Networks a Smart Option, 
PUB. MGMT., Nov. 1, 2010, at 16, 16 (discussing how the greening of land can offer economic 
benefits ranging from increased property values to business development at adjacent 
locations); see also Buzbee, supra note 146, at 384 (“[S]ome of the most valuable real estate in 
the country is near to substantial park spaces.”); EPA Brownfields Grants of $71 Million Will 
Help Address Petroleum and Other Hazards, supra note 26.  Indeed, a 2006 study found that 
property values of nearby homes increased when brownfields were redeveloped as 
greenspaces.  Kaufman & Cloutier, supra note 33, at 27–29. 
151. Read & Fernandez, supra note 150, at 17. 
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or taxes realized from nearby entities.152  Even more, developing 
community greenspace could revitalize blighted neighborhoods by 
enhancing street life, boosting community aesthetics, and providing 
additional free-recreation options.153  By generally enhancing the 
attractiveness of communities, greenspace puts urban cores in better 
positions to attract jobs and private investment.154 
Investment in the greening of urban lands is a potential economic 
“boon” that could be sparked by public funding.155  But is more public 
funding for greenspace development worth it?  Wisconsin’s main 
brownfield-to-greenspace funding package is designed to provide no 
more than $200,000 for cleanup and site assessment.156  In some 
situations, a $200,000 grant would comprise just two or three percent of 
total development costs.157  However, winning a grant can generate local 
interest and knowledge of brownfields reuse issues.158  Plus, one award 
may provide leverage toward obtaining further funding,159 and the ability 
 
152. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141 (suggesting 
that communities might not be aware of some benefits that developing park space provide 
and, further, that communities could and should develop park space but may be taking 
caution in doing so because they are having difficulty financing their present park systems).  
Possibly, smaller park parcels that require minimal maintenance are better suited as 
economically viable ways to grow interest in adjacent properties. 
153. Dunn, supra note 72, at 48 (“Green space helps to increase property values, 
revitalize blighted neighborhoods, enhance street life and community aesthetics, and provide 
free recreation.  Open, active green space, draws people out of their homes and with more 
individuals present in the community, crime can be reduced.”). 
154. See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 379.  In fact, when Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant 
was created, many that recommended it did so because of the benefit they believed 
converting brownfields to greenspace would have on the economic outlooks of those areas.  
See Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141.  A greenspace initiative could 
also reduce sprawl, which some argue is a way to bring jobs and economic activity back to the 
urban core.  Buzbee, supra note 146, at 379. 
155. Dunn, supra note 72, at 60. 
156. Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities Grants, WIS. DNR, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace_grant.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
157. Dull & Wernstedt, supra note 139, at 121.  But see Telephone Interview with David 
Misky, supra note 42 (mentioning that a small award could go a long way toward facilitating 
smaller-scale greenspace conversions). 
158. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 293 (referring to how progress and successful 
brownfield remediation efforts can lead to more revitalization, calling this the “domino 
effect”). 
159. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141; see also Telephone 
Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23 (mentioning that receiving a few brownfields 
redevelopment grants made it easier to obtain and implement other available funding 
options, notably, a $200,000 award through Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant). 
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to package funds may lead to redevelopment success.160  Arguably, the 
low dollar amount suggests that such funding would be best utilized in 
smaller-scale developments of lower overall costs.161 
Municipalities are best-suited to quarterback brownfield-to-
greenspace conversions because of better funding options and because 
public involvement would generate greater stakeholder input.162  Still, an 
argument exists that any private development should be left to the 
market forces without government interference.  Arguably, allowing 
municipalities to quarterback a brownfield-to-greenspace development 
that involves private entities, and allowing those private entities to take 
advantage of public funding designed for municipalities, increases 
government’s influence on private development.163  Although, when 
there is no market, government—or government in conjunction with 
private entities—may have a role in providing avenues to overcome 
development deadlocks.164  PPPs have been proposed to combat market 
failure in the research and development field as a way to alleviate risks 
 
160. See Brown & Kraft, supra note 119, at 381 (“[B]rownfield conversions may prosper 
in suitable conditions—for example, when the public sector owns the land in question, local 
leaders support both the conversion itself and allocation of the converted land to greenspace, 
environmental groups get mobilized, estimates of the costs of maintenance of greenspace are 
not overestimated, and the federal or state government lends support.”); Dull & Wernstedt, 
supra note 139, at 121. 
161. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
162. See van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 114 (adding that more stakeholder 
involvement may increase efficiency). 
163. Any approach that allows the government to influence the competitive aspect of 
private enterprise has been cautioned.  See, e.g., Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic 
Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1964); James S. Burling, Public Private Partnerships—A 
Brave New World or a Return to Serfdom?, in EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUE 
LITIGATION 563, 565 (ALI-ABA, Course of Study, 2009) (“And those who self-identify as 
libertarians would prefer as much absence of government as possible from the design and 
revitalization of American cities, thinking that government interference will at best merely 
delay inevitable economic forces.”). 
164. See Gerry Stoker, Public–Private Partnerships and Urban Governance, in 
PARTNERSHIPS IN URBAN GOVERNANCE: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 34, 
34–35 (Jon Pierre ed., 1997) (“[Governance’s] focus is on the interdependence of 
governmental and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges.  
Governance is about governmental and non-governmental organizations working together.  
Its concern is with how the challenge of collective action is met and the issues and tensions 
associated with this shift in the pattern of governing.”); Graeme Hodge & Carsten Greve, 
Theorizing Public–Private Partnership Success: A Market-Based Alternative to Government? 
17–20 (Syracuse Univ., Pub. Mgmt. Res. Conf., 2011), available at, 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/PMRC_Hodge_and_Grev
e_2011.pdf. 
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associated with investing in certain technologies.165  Likewise, because 
brownfields have created development roadblocks, PPPs may have a 
proper place in brownfields redevelopment, providing assistance in 
some areas, such as information, funding, and clarification—thereby 
addressing financial and uncertainty problems faced by developers.166 
The next Part discusses the recent measures taken by Wisconsin to 
promote efficient brownfields redevelopment—namely, the Wisconsin 
Plant Recovery Initiative (WPRI).  I will then highlight Wisconsin’s 
existing-but-faltering brownfield-to-greenspace grant and two “success 
stories” of that grant’s application. 
V.  WPRI AND THE WISCONSIN GREEN SPACE GRANT 
A.  Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative 
Wisconsin was hit hard in the 2000s by manufacturers leaving its 
urban centers for the outskirts of its own cities and cities of other 
states.167  Not surprisingly, given the state’s industrial heritage and 
progressive environmental focus, Wisconsin has been fairly active on the 
brownfields redevelopment front.168  It adopted numerous reforms 
through its 1994 Land Recycling Act, such as cleanup requirements and 
liability exemptions upon acquiring tax-delinquent property.169  
 
165. Albert N. Link & John T. Scott, Public/Private Partnerships: Stimulating 
Competition in a Dynamic Market, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 763, 766–75 (2001).  Link and 
Scott defined “market failure” as “a condition under which the market, including both the 
R&D-investing producers of a technology and the users of the technology, underinvests from 
society’s standpoint in a particular technology.”  Id. at 767.  They suggested fixing 
underinvestments in the R&D field, in part, by mixing “partial public funding [with] 
privately-performed research.”  Id. at 764. 
166. Mugdan, supra note 25, at 1676 (highlighting that government can provide 
information, money, and clarification or liquidation of liability).  Information might include 
how the site was previously used, what cleanup has been attempted, or what programs are 
available to plant seed money.  Id. at 1776–77.  Money could include Superfund dollars or 
direct and indirect federal grants.  Id. at 1678–80.  Clarification or liquidation of liability 
would include liability relief.  Id. at 1681, 1684.  The government’s purpose might be as simple 
as “managing time-related costs and attenuating developer frustration.”  DE SOUSA, supra 
note 5, at 115. 
167. Presentation at 2010 Wis. Planning Conf., supra note 135, at 3. 
168. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 19, at 14 (“[Wisconsin] offers not only an 
extensive track record of redeveloping different types of brownfield sites but also a wide 
range of program incentives and tools to promote contaminated site cleanup and encourage 
public and private parties to talk about the program.”). 
169. See id. at 15.  Voluntary parties, lenders, and fiduciaries that take title to tax-
delinquent sites are also exempt from cleanup liability.  Harrington, supra note 20, at 985.  
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Wisconsin also received a disproportionately large number of EPA 
brownfields grant awards between 2003 and 2007 when compared to 
other states.170  And Milwaukee, its largest city and industrial center, is 
regarded as having a leading brownfields redevelopment program.171  As 
an example, Milwaukee’s Menomonee River Valley, previously a swath 
of vacant, contaminated lots, has been restored to the industrial mecca 
that it once was because new facilities and outside investors have 
flooded the area in response to a community-wide cleanup and reuse 
plan.172 
Still, the economic downturn created new brownfields,173 and 
currently there are an estimated 8000 in Wisconsin.174  From 2007 to 
2009 the number of yearly plant closings increased by seventy-five 
percent,175 while some estimate that from 2008 to 2009 the raw number 
of closed plants existing in Wisconsin increased by over one hundred.176  
The recent plant closures—which include two major automobile 
plants177—have frustrated Wisconsin’s economy, which has suffered 
approximately 170,000 job losses since 2008.178 
 
Wisconsin’s Land Recycling Act encourages the use of TIF districts as well.  Id. at 986.  See 
generally 1993 Wis. Act 453. 
170. Dull & Wernstedt, supra note 139, at 123 fig.2. 
171. Hunt, supra note 31, at 12. 
172. See, e.g., Eric Decker, Made in Milwaukee: Pizza from the Valley, MILWAUKEE 
BIZTIMES, (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.biztimes.com/news/2011/1/7/made-in-milwaukee-pizza-
from-the-valley (recognizing that the Menomonee Valley has been Milwaukee’s industrial 
center for more than 100 years); William D’Urso, A Sweet Move: Suzy’s Plans Expansion in 
Valley, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 2011, at 1D; E-mail from David Misky, Assistant 
Executive Dir.—Sec’y, Redev. Auth. of the City of Milwaukee, to author (May 31, 2011, 10:30 
CST) (highlighting that a brownfield-to-greenspace conversion was instrumental in attracting 
seven firms to the Valley) (on file with author).  See generally LOCKWOOD GREENE 
CONSULTING ET AL., MARKET STUDY, ENGINEERING, AND LAND USE PLAN FOR THE 
MENOMONEE VALLEY (1998); DE SOUSA, supra note 5, at 249–62. 
173. Presentation at 2010 Wis. Planning Conf., supra note 135, at 10. 
174. Id. at 8. 
175. Id. at 15. 
176. Redevelopment and Reuse, supra note 135, at 19. 
177. Thomas Content, Chrysler Won’t Keep Kenosha Engine Plant, JSONLINE (May 1, 
2009), http://www.jsonline.com/business/44162607.html (highlighting that a Chrysler engine 
plant in Kenosha, Wisconsin, will close, resulting in approximately 800 job losses); 
WisBusiness: Janesville Deals with Fallout from GM Plant Closure, WISBUSINESS.COM 
(June 4, 2008), http://wisbusiness.com/index.Iml?Article=127877 (highlighting the closure of a 
longstanding GM facility in Janesville, Wisconsin, that will result in the loss of over 2000 
jobs). 
178. John Schmid, State Reports a Gain of 12,900 Private-Sector Jobs, JSONLINE (July 
21, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/business/125961833.html (noting that approximately 
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The pattern of plant closures triggered the WDNR to form the 
Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative (WPRI) in March 2010.179  WPRI—
which targets non-NPL properties—is designed to address 
environmental issues during plant closings, reach out to local 
governments and private businesses, and, ultimately, expedite the 
cleanup and reuse process of Wisconsin’s closed plants by providing 
financial assistance and regulatory guidance.180 
By “speed[ing] up the clean-up and revitalization of plants,” WPRI 
should help municipalities attract private enterprise.181  Under the 
initiative, $1 million in WDNR assessment monies are available,182 with 
 
171,000 jobs were lost during the 2008–2009 recession); 2010 Wisconsin Plant Recovery 
Initiative (WPRI) and WPRI Assessment Monies Webinar, Presentation 2 (Mar. 23, 2010) 
[hereinafter WPRI Webinar], available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/training/wpri_wam.pdf.  
Over 40% of the lost jobs were in the manufacturing sector.  Id.  During the drafting of this 
Comment, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker took office under a promise to drastically 
increase private-sector jobs.  Summer 2011 estimates suggest that Wisconsin’s steady decline 
of manufacturing jobs is turning around.  See Schmid, supra; Press Release, Wis. Dep’t 
Workforce Dev., May Jobs, Unemployment Numbers Announced for State (June 16, 2011), 
available at http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dwd/newsreleases/2011/unemployment/110616_june_ 
state.pdf (highlighting the addition of 13,100 manufacturing jobs between January and May, 
2011).  This footnote is meant solely to acknowledge that Wisconsin’s manufacturing sector 
may be finding a way to reverse the downward spiral it was in for much of the past decade.  
Surely, there are other, better ways to increase jobs than simply to cleanup brownfields; 
however, these statistics should not diminish any understanding that the many closed plants in 
Wisconsin increased its brownfields problem, nor diminish the fact that Wisconsin’s job losses 
before Governor Walker took office were far greater than the estimated 50,000 to have been 
created since then.  See Schmid, supra. 
179. See, e.g., WPRI Webinar, supra note 178, at 2; George Marek & Alexander Gore, 
Wisconsin DNR Launches Industrial and Commercial Facilities Recovery Initiative: Benefits 
for Wisconsin Municipalities, PUB. FIN. L. UPDATE (Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, 
Wis.), Mar. 2010, available at http://www.quarles.com/files/Publication/c9bd9bf8-1e99-47dd-
9ec2-5f05cfab5fd3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/13c90d72-1f30-43fb-b64912321c3215d 
d/Wisconsin%20DNR%20Update.pdf; Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra note 
42. 
180. Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative, WIS. DNR, http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/ 
rbrownfields/wpri.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
181. Marek & Gore, supra note 179; see also WIS. DNR, WISCONSIN DNR PLANT 
RECOVERY INITIATIVE (2010), available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/ 
RR862.pdf (noting that the initiative assists both businesses and communities in prompt 
clean-up). 
182. George Marek & Alexander Gore, Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative: Grant and 
Technical Services Opportunities Expand as Program Matures, PUB. FIN. L. UPDATE (Quarles 
& Brady LLP, Milwaukee, Wis.), Oct.  2010, available at http://www.quarles.com/ 
wisconsin_plant_recovery_initiative_oct_2010/ (“[A] total of $1 million is available to local 
governments and other eligible applicants to hire environmental consultants to investigate 
environmental contamination, including Phase I and/or Phase II site assessments, NR 716 site 
investigations and underground storage tank . . . removals.”). 
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$200,000 allowed per project.183  For a property to be eligible for 
funding, a municipality does not need to own the parcel but must have 
access to it.184  The “top goal” is “to assess environmentally 
contaminated sites where important community jobs have been lost—
with the hope of attracting new manufacturing plants or other 
businesses.”185 
B.  The Wisconsin Green Space Grant 
WPRI evidences Wisconsin’s continued push for creative ways to 
solve its brownfields problem.  I question, then, the failed maintenance 
of one creative program, which implements greenspace and has 
previously helped Wisconsin communities revitalize contaminated 
properties in blighted areas. 
Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant helped twenty-one projects acquire 
funding in the past decade.186  At its inception, the Green Space Grant 
was one of the first of its kind.187  This grant focuses on helping local 
governments redevelop brownfields for long-term public use.188  It is 
available only to public entities,189 but non-profit organizations are 
 
183. Wisconsin Plant Recovery Initiative Assessment Monies (WAM), WIS. DNR, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/financial/wam/index.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
184. Id. 
185. WPRI Webinar, supra note 178, at 47.  Further goals include increasing the number 
of communities that clean up contaminated properties, encouraging community and public 
awareness, and leveraging public resources.  Id. at 6–7. 
186. DNR GREEN SPACE & PUBLIC FACILITIES GRANTS: ROUND ONE GRANT 
AWARDS, 2004 [hereinafter DNR ROUND ONE], available at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/round1.pdf (highlighting that round one 
provided eleven total awards); DNR GREEN SPACE & PUBLIC FACILITIES GRANTS: ROUND 
TWO GRANT AWARDS, 2006 [hereinafter DNR ROUND TWO], available at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/round2.pdf (round two provided eight 
awards); DNR GREEN SPACE & PUBLIC FACILITIES GRANTS: ROUND THREE GRANT 
AWARDS, 2008–2009 [hereinafter DNR ROUND THREE], available at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/round3.pdf (round three provided two 
awards). 
187. Press Release, Wis. DNR, Hassett Announces New DNR Grants to Help Clean Up 
Brownfields for Public Use (Apr. 13, 2004), available at http://www.wnrmag.com/org/ 
aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/gs-04-04.pdf. 
188. Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities Grants, supra note 156. 
189. For example, “[e]ligible applicants include tribes, cities, villages, towns, counties, 
redevelopment authorities, community development authorities and housing authorities.”  Id.  
Recipients must match up to 50% of the award amount, depending on the size of the grant.  
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.15(1)(a)–(c) (current through 669 Wis. Admin. Reg. (Oct. 1, 
2011)). 
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allowed to partner-up with participating municipalities.190  Upon 
receiving funding and redeveloping a plot into greenspace or public 
facilities, the municipality must hold the property to that public use for 
at least twenty years.191 
The Green Space Grant previously had available $1 million in grant 
money during 2001–2003 and 2005–2007.192  Presently though, the 
program has no available funds.193  With previous awards of up to 
$200,000 for site assessment and cleanup,194 this grant program could be 
helpful to municipalities looking to incorporate greenspace as a part of 
redevelopment efforts—particularly for smaller-scale infill projects with 
lower total cleanup costs. 
Below I highlight two examples of how the Green Space Grant and 
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions improved the environmental 
health and economic viability of blighted areas in two Wisconsin cities. 
C.  Successful Green Space Grant Application in Oshkosh and Delavan, 
Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin cities of Oshkosh195 and Delavan196 each received 
 
190. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR §§ 173.15(2), .17(1)(a) (current through 669 Wis. 
Admin. Reg. (Oct. 1, 2011)). 
191. Id. §§ 173.05, .17(1)(b). 
192. Siikamäki & Wernstedt, supra note 9, at 568. 
193. The 2011–2013 Wisconsin biennial budget does not fund the Grant.  See E-mail 
from Michael Prager, Land Recycling Team Leader, Wis. DNR, to author (June 20, 2011 
02:44 CST) (on file with author); Brownfield Green Space and Public Facilities Grants, supra 
note 156.  See generally 2011 Wis. Act 32. 
194. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.15. 
195. The City of Oshkosh has approximately 64,000 residents.  Oshkosh (city), 
Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/5560500.html 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2011).  It is located in the middle of Wisconsin’s Fox River Valley, the 
state’s third largest metropolitan area, and once prospered with a strong lumber industry.  
Historical Summary of the City of Oshkosh, CITY OF OSHKOSH, 
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/landmarks_commission/City_History.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 
2011).  Its present fame rests, generally, on two things: the Oshkosh B’Gosh children’s 
clothing company (which originated in the city) and the annual Experimental Aircraft 
Association convention (which draws over 750,000 visitors to the city each year).  CITY OF 
OSHKOSH, COMMUNITY RELATIONS PLAN, U.S. EPA BROWNFIELD CLEANUP GRANT 3, 
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Community_Development/Planning_Services/assets/pdf/brownfie
ld_grants/Community_Relations_Plan_Parcel%20H_Redevelopment%20_2_.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2011). 
196. The City of Delavan, located approximately one hour southwest of Milwaukee, 
maintains nearly 8000 residents according to 2000 census estimates and has a surrounding 
town of about 4500.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DELAVAN CITY, WISCONSIN 1 (2000), available 
at http://censtats.census.gov/data/WI/1605519450.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DELAVAN 
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$200,000 in 2004 as part of the first round of awards administered by the 
Green Space Grant.197  Each city’s project—funded in part by this 
grant—is a documented success story by the WDNR.198 
1. Oshkosh—Riverside Park & Leach Amphitheater 
Oshkosh’s Riverside Park is located where downtown Oshkosh 
meets the Fox River.199  In 2002, debris, contaminated soil, and 
underground gas holders were removed from the riverside location that 
once housed a manufactured gas plant.200  The city purchased the 
property in 2003, and, with a $200,000 Green Space Grant award and 
other funding, the community developed a recreational space, which 
includes a riverwalk and a music venue (Leach Amphitheater).201  The 
project’s success has led to continued development efforts.202 
The Leach Amphitheater, which opened in 2005, is an outdoor 
riverfront music venue that can accommodate up to 7500 visitors per 
event.203  The venue, which is operated by the Oshkosh Parks 
Department,204 has sparked Oshkosh’s entertainment scene and 
continues to generate revenue for the city through events: notably, three 
festivals, Waterfest, Irishfest, and Oktoberfest, use the facility (the latter 
 
TOWN, WALWORTH COUNTY, WISCONSIN 1 (2000), available at 
http://censtats.census.gov/data/WI/0605512719475.pdf.  Delavan’s industrial history dates 
back to the mid-1800s; currently, it sits on a freight-rail corridor and Interstate Highway 43.  
History of Delavan, Wisconsin, CITY OF DELAVAN, http://ci.delavan.wi.us/history.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
197. See DNR ROUND ONE, supra note 186. 
198. Remediation & Redevelopment Success Stories, supra note 145. 
199. See CITY OF OSHKOSH, DOWNTOWN ACTION PLAN 18–19 (2000), available at 
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Community_Development/Planning_Services/downtown_action_
plan.asp. 
200. Riverside Park/Leach Amphitheater, REMEDIATION & REDEV. PROGRAM (Wis. 
DNR, Madison, Wis.), Nov. 2007, available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs 
/RR777.pdf. 
201. Id.  The city’s plans to expand the park date back to the early 1990s.  E-mail from 
Darryn Burich, Planning Dir., City of Oshkosh, to author (Jan. 13, 2011, 10:26:00 CST) (on 
file with author). 
202. See A. NELESSEN ASSOCS., VISION REPORT: CITY OF OSHKOSH 54 (2009) 
(highlighting that Leach Amphitheater has been a success and contemplating other 
entertainment avenues that would further redevelopment efforts). 
203. LEACH AMPHITHEATER, http://www.leachamphitheater.com/index.asp (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2011). 
204. Parks Department, CITY OF OSHKOSH, http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Parks/ (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
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two being non-existent before the Leach’s creation).205 
Waterfest is an Oshkosh institution and was a music destination for 
the area long before the Leach was developed; however, the Leach has 
enhanced its success.  The weekly summer festival series used to have 
free admission, but with the increase in attendance and the attraction of 
more popular music acts, it now charges up to $20 for individual 
admission on a given night with season passes available that are worth 
$200.206  The city estimates that Waterfest has entertained 60,000 to 
70,000 guests annually since it moved to the Leach.207 
Lost among Oshkosh’s entertainment upgrades can be how it got 
there.  Recall that before the Leach Amphitheater became a reality, that 
portion of Riverside Park was simply a brownfield.208  A little 
greenspace, a portion of a riverwalk, and one band-shell created a boost 
in visitors and future development prospects for a mid-sized city. 
The present city planner insists that the $200,000 Green Space Grant 
“very effectively” guided the project forward by helping pay for cleanup 
costs.209  Without it, the city would have had to scramble for other 
funding—funding that Oshkosh is currently having trouble finding to 
complete the riverwalk that begins at Riverside Park.210 
The Riverside Park expansion demonstrates the potential benefits of 
incorporating greenspaces and park-based public facilities into 
brownfields remediation efforts, and how important a mere $200,000 
can be to moving a project forward.  Quite possibly, if Green Space 
Grant funding was available, such funding could give an extra boost to 
the currently stalled Oshkosh riverwalk expansion—an expansion that is 
integral to a Downtown Plan expected to result in nearly 200 created 
 
205. See Erin Crowley, Top Eleven Events to See in 2011, THENORTHWESTERN.COM 
(Dec. 30, 2010) (on file with the Oshkosh Public Library) (mentioning that 2010 will be the 
third year for Irishfest and second year for Oktoberfest); OSHKOSH IRISH FEST, 
http://www.oshkoshirishfest.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); Admission, OSHKOSH 
OKTOBERFEST, http://www.oshkoshoktoberfest.com/admission.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 
2011). 
206. About Waterfest, WATERFEST.ORG, http://www.waterfest.org/about.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2011).  For acts that have previously performed at Waterfest, see Waterfest 
Distinguished Alumni, WATERFEST.ORG, http://waterfest.org/alumni.html (last visited Oct. 
16, 2011). 
207. About Waterfest, supra note 206. 
208. See Riverside Park/Leach Amphitheater, supra note 200. 
209. E-mail from Darryn Burich, supra note 201. 
210. Id. 
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jobs and $800,000 in property tax value increases.211 
2. Delavan—Borg Instruments Greenspace and Retention Area 
Delavan developed a greenspace and storm-water retention area 
(Borg greenspace) with a $200,000 Green Space Grant that it received in 
2004.212  The Borg greenspace is part of the larger Ann Street Rail 
Corridor brownfields project that is ongoing and part of a community 
plan to revamp a blighted area.213  The Borg greenspace sits on the 
former site of Borg Instruments, a local timing device and clock 
manufacturer.214  This brownfield-to-greenspace conversion 
demonstrates potential success, as opposed to the actual success of 
Oshkosh’s amphitheater. 
Overall, the Ann Street Rail Corridor Project received $329,170 in 
total brownfield WDNR Site Assessment Grants and $200,000 through 
the Green Space Grant program.215  The project also received $625,000 
from the Wisconsin Department of Commerce for “blight 
elimination,”216 while the City of Delavan received over $2 million in 
general funds from the EPA.217 
Delavan residents indicated in a survey that the Ann Street Corridor 
was especially “unpleasant or unattractive,” so it was important for 
Delavan to alter the perception of that area of town.218  Presently, 
 
211. CITY OF OSHKOSH, APPLICATION FOR EPA COMMUNITY-WIDE BROWNFIELDS 
ASSESSMENT GRANTS: HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES AND PETROLEUM 18 (2010), available at 
http://www.ci.oshkosh.wi.us/Community_Development/Planning_Services/assets/pdf/EPA_A
ssessment_Grant_Petro_Haz_10_1.pdf. 
212. Delavan Borg Instruments, REMEDIATION & REDEV. PROGRAM (Wis. DNR, 
Madison, Wis.), Jan. 2009, available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/RR815.pdf. 
213. Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23.  The city wanted to 
redevelop the former Borg site to reduce crime and safety threats in that neighborhood.  
Delavan Redevelopment Authority, WI, BROWNFIELDS 2004 REVOLVING LOAN FUND 
GRANT FACT SHEET (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), June 2004, available at 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/bf_factsheets/gfs/index.cfm?event=factsheet.display&display_type=PDF
&xpg_id=3665.  The redevelopment was also designed to attract commercial development 
and increase new jobs, in addition to simply adding greenspace.  Id. 
214. Delavan Borg Instruments, supra note 212. 
215. AYRES ASSOCS., FINDING FUNDING FOR YOUR PROJECTS 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.ayresassociates.com/images/services/general_civil/grant%20brochure%20pdf%20
version%202%202009.pdf. 
216. Id. at 2. 
217. Id. at 6. 
218. VANDEWALLE & ASSOCS., CITY OF DELAVAN, WISCONSIN, COMPREHENSIVE 
PLAN 14–15 (Common Council Adoption, Nov. 10, 2009). 
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Delavan wishes to relocate its fire station to the Borg greenspace area, 
as well as change that area’s industrial zone to light manufacturing, 
commercial, and medium-density housing.219  These changes could shift 
the blighted condition of the Ann Street Rail Corridor to make it a 
more appealing neighborhood. 
Though there has been some development interest around the 
property, a poor economy halted progress.220  As it stands, a new car-
wash is the only commercial development to spring up adjacent to the 
property containing the greenspace;221 however, the car-wash 
development needed funding support for environmental cleanup from 
the community and State of Wisconsin.222  We will have to wait for a 
better economy to truly see what kind of development could prosper 
near the Borg greenspace.223 
The Delavan Director of Public Works, who oversees the Ann Street 
project, insists that the $200,000 was very helpful to moving the project 
forward.224  In an interview, he was adamant that the Borg site 
significantly cleaned up a blighted area and made the surrounding 
properties better suited for residential development—which he said the 
City wants to include in that area’s plan through some form of 
apartment housing.225  He mentioned that the City planned the retention 
area before realizing that the Green Space Grant existed.226  But, upon 
applying for the Green Space Grant and receiving the award, the project 
came to fruition much quicker than it would have had the City not 
obtained an extra $200,000 in funding.227 
 
219. Id. at 66, 85. 
220. Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23. 
221. Id. 
222. Id.  According to Mark Wendorf, Delavan’s Director of Public Works, the car wash 
needed public and state support primarily because its bank refused to provide funding unless 
other avenues provided cleanup assistance.  Id.  However, Mr. Wendorf could not say 
whether the Borg greenspace had anything to do with the car wash developing where it did.  
Id. 
223. See id. (during which the interviewee insisted that the unfortunate dawn of a 
recession has restricted the city’s ability to attract development more quickly).  Mr. Wendorf 
mentioned that developers were interested in 2003 and 2004, but that by the time the Ann 
Street cleanup neared completion the economy began to suffer and prospective developers 
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The Delavan project was not as instantly and substantially successful 
as the Oshkosh amphitheater, but it has potential: the Green Space 
Grant helped Delavan realize what should be done with a blighted 
property and helped it realize how to incorporate the Borg parcel into 
the overall plans of the Ann Street Corridor.228  Moreover, the 
interviewee said that Delavan will look to the Green Space Grant if 
there are plans to develop public spaces in the future because the 
$200,000 award was helpful in terms of funding and efficiency.229 
D.  Maintaining the Green Space Grant 
The Oshkosh and Delavan cases demonstrate how powerful 
greenspace or park space oriented projects can be to facilitating 
community-wide brownfields redevelopment efforts.  Each project made 
blighted areas of two Wisconsin cities more marketable and improved 
the quality of life (even if the Delavan project’s full impact is yet to be 
seen). 
Unfortunately, not all Green Space Grant awards have resulted in 
such glowing outcomes.  For example, a condominium and lakefront 
project in Racine, Wisconsin, that had a market value of roughly $200 
million, was put to rest two years ago.230  The money Racine won 
through the Green Space Grant—which the city was going to use to 
develop public space near the condos—was returned by the city.231  Due 
to the large size of the Racine project, its failure suggests that the Green 
Space Grant award had very little to do with it actually moving forward.  
This suggests that a Green Space Grant award has less impact in 
furthering larger-scale brownfield projects than smaller projects like the 
Delavan and Oshkosh examples. 
Still, in some circumstances, $200,000 can go a long way.  The 
Oshkosh and Delavan projects suggest that creative funding provisions 
directed at brownfield-to-greenspace conversions may result in quality 
of life and economic gains that are well worth the marginal WDNR 
spending that might be required to push forward smaller projects. 
 
228. See id. 
229. Id. 
230. Michael Burke, The Point Blues: Lakefront Development Plan Collapses, J. TIMES 
(Racine, Wis.), Jan. 12, 2008, at 1A; Tom Daykin, Racine Lakefront Project Canceled, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 2008, at 2D. 
231. City Returned West Racine Grant to Preserve Development Options, RACINE POST 
(June 9, 2010), http://news.racinepost.com/2010/06/city-returned-west-racine-grant-to.html. 
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VI.  A GREEN SPACE GRANT WITH A PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
OPTION 
The Delavan and Oshkosh examples demonstrate why greater 
priority should be placed on implementing greenspace redevelopment 
incentives into brownfields programs.  States should build off of 
programs like the Green Space Grant, not strip away the future use of 
those grants.  Funding for the Green Space Grant may have halted 
because it was a less attractive option on its face.232  So, because 
developments related to the Grant’s use have shown economic progress, 
making the Grant more attractive could increase awareness; and this 
could be done by loosening the private-use restrictions (such as the 
twenty-year deed restriction that the Grant imposes).233  Increased 
flexibility may lead to better funding prospects,234 so relaxing some of 
the arguably-strict conditions and eligibility rules of the Green Space 
Grant235 may be appropriate—though this would have to be done with 
the definition of “public use” in mind.236 
After phase I and II cleanup occurs in conjunction with Green Space 
Grant awards, one condition is that “[t]he end use will have a long-term 
public benefit, including preservation of green space, development of 
recreational areas or use by a local government.”237  This seems fair 
because creating a public benefit was a founding reason for this Grant’s 
existence.238  But, to be reimbursed, a municipality must agree to 
maintain that end use and own the property for at least twenty years.239  
This ownership and use restriction prevents private entities from 
reaping cleanup assistance and benefits because private entities, even if 
developing greenspace themselves, do not have access to this Grant.  In 
 
232. See Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141. 
233. Loosening the restrictions responds to the call of some proponents of brownfields 
regulatory reform who insist on greater flexibility and innovation.  See, e.g., Wernstedt & 
Hersh, supra note 13, at 16. 
234. See id. at 51, 57–58. 
235. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.05(1) (current through 669 Wis. Admin. Reg. 
(Oct. 1, 2011)). 
236. Moreover, to make alterations, all statutory provisions guiding NR Chapter 173 
may need to be altered because any administrative authority expressed by the WDNR must 
adhere to the statutory provisions that govern that agency’s actions.  See Wis. Builders Assoc. 
v. Wis. Dep’t Trans., 2005 WI App 160, ¶ 9, 285 Wis. 2d 472, 702 N.W.2d 433. 
237. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.05(2)(a). 
238. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141 (mentioning that creating 
a “public benefit” is one of the grant’s purposes). 
239. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.17(1)(b). 
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this way, the twenty-year clause restricts municipalities from attracting 
economic development in creative ways.240  Moreover, municipalities 
may shy away from its use because it restricts their ability to alter the 
property’s function for twenty years—in fact, one reason the City of 
Racine returned its award was because it discovered the deed 
restriction.241 
Arguably, allowing private entities to take ownership of and utilize 
the newly cleaned up land is “having a long-term public benefit” 
because private development could spur job creation or taxable 
contributions.242  This conception of public benefit is similar to public 
benefit as defined in the eminent domain context, where plans to 
revitalize economic areas through economic development have met the 
public use requirement of the U.S. and state constitutions.243  For 
another comparison, a “public improvement,” as it relates to subdivision 
development in Wisconsin, is something that “improves the value or 
utility of the subdivision and is made available for use by the public.”244  
Added economic development improves the value to the public at large 
because it brings in jobs and tax revenue, so it is not such a far stretch to 
consider private uses of land to be public benefits in the brownfields 
 
240. See McCarthy, supra note 18, at 293 (arguing that government requirements 
concerning the future use of a redeveloped plot of land can restrict opportunities for 
communities to profit off of that land). 
241. City Returned West Racine Grant to Preserve Development Options, supra note 231. 
242. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
243. The Court in Kelo v. City of New London held that a city’s plan to acquire 
properties through eminent domain and dispose of them to private developers “to revitalize 
an economically distressed city,” was in line with the “public use” requirement of the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  545 U.S. 469, 472, 485, 489 (2005).  States may impose 
stricter “public use” requirements than this, and “public benefit” in the context of chapter 173 
of Wisconsin’s Natural Resources Code may have a different meaning than “public use” in 
the context of the Takings Clause, but Kelo nevertheless suggests that stimulating an area’s 
economy may logically be thought of as a “public benefit.”  See id. at 189.  Some argue that 
“the power of eminent domain is needed . . . where recalcitrant slumlords or commercial 
property owners are sitting on brownfields or underutilized properties that are hurting a 
community.”  Robert S. Goldsmith & Robert Beckelman, What Will Happen to 
Redevelopment in New Jersey When the Economy Recovers?, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 314, 327 
(2009).  In New Jersey, the redevelopment of blighted properties falls under the public 
purpose requirement of eminent domain, consistent with New Jersey’s constitution.  See N.J. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (“The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of 
blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private property may be 
taken or acquired.”); Goldsmith & Beckelman, supra, at 317. 
244. Rogers Dev., Inc. v. Rock Cnty. Planning & Dev. Comm., 2003 WI App 13, ¶ 13, 
265 Wis. 2d 214, 666 N.W.2d 504 (defining public improvement and, moreover, holding that 
the term “public improvement” should not be narrowly construed). 
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redevelopment framework.245  Moreover, the public at large has access 
to many private developments, particularly retail establishments and 
developments that maintain park spaces.246  Thus, if “access” was 
regarded as a “public benefit,” then even more private developments 
could satisfy that overall goal. 
Greater institutional controls247 for how a municipality or private 
investor can redevelop a brownfield may hinder economic development 
in areas tarnished by vacant lots and unappealing job prospects.  The 
twenty-year deed restriction in chapter 173, as is, is an unnecessary 
control that could hinder economic activity because, for twenty years, 
municipalities using the Green Space Grant cannot sell the greened land 
or allow private entities to control it.  Considering the economy and 
Wisconsin’s job situation, these restrictions should contemplate cities 
possibly wanting to sell already cleaned land for much-needed private 
development.  Also, the restrictions should contemplate that private 
entities might be interested in a location if they had rights to the use of 
adjacent greened land.  If one of the goals of allowing the grant is to 
promote greenspace, whether the greenspace is controlled publicly or 
privately should not matter—a PPP model is a step toward ensuring 
community involvement alongside private investment. 
A.  A Public–Private Partnership that Encourages Broad-Based 
Community Support 
PPPs ensure that communities are involved—and when communities 
are involved, brownfields redevelopment is more likely to meet 
environmental justice goals or standards.248  Moreover, if the Green 
 
245. Unfortunately, there is no case in Wisconsin that describes what “public benefit” 
means in the context of chapter 173. 
246. The definition of “public” in Wisconsin, adopted from Black’s Law Dictionary, is 
“[o]pen or available for all to use, share, or enjoy.”  Rogers Dev., 2003 WI App 13, ¶ 13, 265 
Wis. 2d 214, 666 N.W.2d 504 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (7th ed. 1999)). 
247. “Institutional controls” may be defined as “‘legal or physical restrictions or 
limitations on the use of, or access to, a site or facility . . . to prevent activities that could 
interfere with the effectiveness of a response action.’”  Amy L. Edwards, Institutional 
Controls, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 192, 193 (defining activity and use limitation and 
identifying that “institutional controls are a type of [a]ctivity and [u]se [l]imitation” (quoting 
ASTM International, Standard Guide for the Use of Activity and Use Limitations, 11 ANNUAL 
BOOK OF ASTM STANDARDS 1282, 1283 (2000))).  A deed restriction is a type of 
institutional control.  Id. at 196. 
248. Davies, supra note 138, at 288, 316.  Sustainable development is also better 
facilitated through public–private partnerships.  Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 57, at 519. 
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Space Grant allowed for such partnerships for ownership purposes, then 
communities might be even more interested than they presently are 
because the grant would maintain flexibility in the long run for 
communities using the Grant to do with the property what is best 
without handcuffing those using it from, essentially, ever changing the 
property’s nature. 
A PPP that encourages the swapping of land and its designated 
purposes is not unforeseen in practice.249  The New Jersey Brownfield 
Development Area program (BDA program) attempts to develop 
blighted areas in clusters under the watch of community steering 
committees and case managers.250  Through the BDA program, private 
developers and contractors have access to a more diverse array of 
funding sources and will receive preliminary environmental assessments; 
all the while, the public steering committee and other community 
stakeholders are involved in directing a large-scale remediation effort.251 
In similar form, Sheboygan, Wisconsin’s South Pier and Blue Harbor 
Resort brownfields project is an example of an indirect PPP: the project 
was not officially designed as a PPP, but the results are similar.  The 
 
249. In Elizabeth, New Jersey, a publicly held property “destined for park development” 
was next to a marina resting in a location primed for commercial activity.  Van Hook et al., 
supra note 122, at 151.  The “Elizabethport Brownfield Development Area” worked on 
swapping the public land for land held by private developers so they could develop on the 
potential park space, which was ready to use and better suited for economic activity.  See id.  
The end result of the Elizabethport brownfields project was a massive mixed-use commercial 
and residential development that is estimated to include over 6000 created jobs.  N.J. REDEV. 
AUTH., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT: CREATIVE COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS 12, available at 
http://www.njra.us/njra/lib/njra/njra_2005_annual_report.pdf; see also BDA Sites at a Glance, 
N.J. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT. (Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/sites/ 
(providing specific results from the Elizabethport brownfields project, including commercial 
and residential end use).  It is unclear how much the contemplated land swap had to do with 
the final project, but, at the very least, the fact that such innovative measures were strongly 
considered in a successful brownfields redevelopment project is thought provoking. 
250. Maro, supra note 80, at 174–75.  The goal of the BDA program is to “design, 
coordinate and implement remediation and reuse plans affecting multiple sites in close 
proximity.”  David B. Farer, Brownfields Redevelopment Initiatives: Federal and Selected State 
Developments, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: BROWNFIELDS AND BEYOND 1055, 1151–52 (ALI-ABA, Course of 
Study, 2010). 
251. Maro, supra note 80, at 176 (citing van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 124–25) 
(noting that steering committees design and implement informal plans and that the state 
“make[s] sure assessments are completed”).  Because of the collective approach, resources 
and grants from multiple organizations become available to BDA program developments.  Id.  
With all community stakeholders involved, “a for-profit site proposal [could] coincide with 
the addition of a green space or community-desired site.”  Id. at 178–79. 
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Sheboygan project used extensive public funding—including over $3 
million in WDNR land recycling and commerce grants—which resulted 
in part public (beach access, boardwalk, eco-park) and part private 
(resort, restaurant) property.252  Ultimately, redeveloping brownfields in 
clusters that involve public and private entities in cooperation could add 
efficiency to the process, pull in more stakeholders, and provide greater 
public value.253 
If a land-sharing model through the Green Space Grant ever moves 
forward, then public approval of such development will likely gain 
importance.  The idea of public approval in brownfields redevelopment 
has already been contemplated.254  A similar approach would be to have 
private entities and municipalities partnering to maintain “public 
relations” teams to form consensus among all stakeholders.255  It is also 
wise for city planning to involve local residents and the general public 
because, while public brownfields promotion could spark political action 
and public approval for redevelopment,256 a lack of communication 
could discourage community support.257 
The “EPA’s Brownfields Program empowers states, communities, 
and other stakeholders to work together to prevent, assess, safely clean 
up, and sustainably reuse brownfields.”258  In light of the present 
 
252. 2006 Phoenix Award Community Impact Winner: Sheboygan Harbor Center, 
REMEDIATION & REDEV. PROGRAM (Wis. DNR, Madison, Wis.), July 2006, available at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/rr/archives/pubs/RR759.pdf; see also Redevelopment and Reuse, 
supra note 135, at 45–54 (providing the South Pier’s mixed-use plan details and financing 
breakdown). 
253. Van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 114. 
254. Pippin, supra note 28, at 604–05; see also Davies, supra note 138, at 298 
(highlighting that in Michigan some grants require “local support” for a project). 
255. See generally Howard C. Landau, Building Consensus for the Project, in 
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 6, at 149, 149–54.  Others have suggested “public dialogues,” 
where community residents can voice concerns about a project, and “working groups,” where 
a smaller number of community leaders sit down with redevelopment officials and strategize 
community remediation efforts.  Chambers, supra note 7, at 250–51. 
256. Robertson, supra note 33, at 1090. 
257. See, e.g., Janice Christensen, Garden Park: A Catalytic Project, RIVERWEST 
CURRENTS (May 3, 2009), http://www.riverwestcurrents.org/20090503169/News/Articles/ 
Garden-Park-A-Catalytic-Project.html (highlighting resident backlash over the 
Redevelopment Authority of Milwaukee’s failure to communicate a brownfields 
redevelopment plan). 
258. Delavan Redevelopment Authority, WI, supra note 213; see also Sustainable Reuse—
Ensuring that a Brownfield’s Reuse Offers the Greatest Social, Economic, and Environmental 
Benefit to the Community, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES (U.S. EPA, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 
2003, available at http://epa.gov/brownfields/success/Green_Sust_Dev.pdf (explaining the 
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economy, partnership efforts are a logical way to spur economic 
revitalization through brownfields redevelopment.  Thus, states should 
not ignore the positives of implementing PPPs that take advantage of 
economic benefits directly or indirectly related to brownfield-to-
greenspace conversions.259  Using partnership initiatives with greenspace 
redevelopment is consistent with environmental cleanup, job creation, 
and local taxability improvements—three key components to successful 
brownfields redevelopment.260 
B.  The Public–Private Green Space Grant 
Present and future provisions must not restrict or dissuade 
municipalities with available funding from working with private entities 
or facilitating brownfields redevelopment in creative fashions.  In fact, 
any provision should encourage creativity, innovation, and partnership.  
If “brownfield conversions may prosper . . . when the public sector owns 
the land in question, local leaders support both the conversion itself and 
allocation of the converted land to greenspace, environmental groups get 
mobilized, estimates of the costs of maintenance of greenspace are not 
overestimated, and the federal or state government lends support,”261 
then the public should obtain an ownership stake in the process and 
greenspace should be involved.  This Part explains how adjustments to 
Wisconsin’s Green Space Grant that would allow for use by PPPs could 
 
program’s intent to encourage cooperation and efficiency throughout the redevelopment 
process). 
259. Greenspace Uses, supra note 45, at 2.  For example, in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, a 
$200,000 site assessment grant from the EPA was used to help develop a formerly blighted 
industrial site into Riverfront Park.  Id. at 1–2.  Fitchburg’s Riverfront Park triggered the 
development of a major street, parking, a riverwalk, and additional nearby brownfields 
cleanup.  Id. at 2.  Similarly, Jordan Valley Park in Springfield, Missouri, bolstered the 
economy of that city.  More than the Environment, supra note 10, at 1–2.  The Jordan Valley 
space was formerly a car dealership and factories, but now houses a public park, civic 
building, and an amphitheater, among other features.  Id. 
260. Telephone Interview with David Misky, supra note 42.  States have also used land 
banking.  “Land banking is the process through which local governments acquire and 
assemble properties to ‘bank’ land for short or long-term strategic public purposes.”  Silva, 
supra note 3, at 614.  See generally Tappendorf & Denzin, supra note 54.  Through land 
banking, communities have turned swaths of blighted land into affordable housing.  Silva, 
supra, at 619–21 (identifying land banks in St. Louis, Louisville, and Atlanta that developed 
low-income and public housing).  Similar to brownfields redevelopment, land banking is 
hampered by funding restrictions and tax foreclosure laws.  Id. at 628.  Arguably, these 
restrictions prevent economic redevelopment in those areas—especially considering the vast 
land segments that land banks are designed for.  Id. at 621–22. 
261. Brown & Kraft, supra note 119, at 381 (emphasis added). 
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better facilitate brownfield-to-greenspace conversions and, generally, 
improve opportunities for communities to remediate contaminated 
properties.  
Projects receiving Green Space Grant funding were supposed to 
attract businesses and increase property values.262  Thus, it seems that 
the Grant’s motive was to balance environmental and economic 
progress.  Some believe that private investments stimulated by 
brownfield-to-greenspace conversions could trigger millions of dollars 
worth of other improvements,263 so it seems odd that greenspace-specific 
programs would not be taken seriously by the state for future funding 
purposes.264  Further, when made available, the demand for the Green 
Space Grant was almost twice what the Grant was able to meet,265 and 
municipalities continue to request money for it despite the present lack 
of funding.266 
While awarding additional money through the Grant in 2007, former 
Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle recognized that brownfield-to-
greenspace conversions are vital to restoring jobs and increasing 
property values.267  Delavan’s Ann Street Corridor and Oshkosh’s Leach 
Amphitheater have done just that.  Therefore, it seems misguided to not 
continue funding the Grant. 
Section 173.05(2)(a) of Wisconsin’s Natural Resources Code 
maintains that the end use must have a long-term public benefit for 
parties to receive grant money under that section.268  If this is the real 
goal of the grants allowable under chapter 173, then, arguably, the 
 
262. Hassett Announces New DNR Grants to Help Clean Up Brownfields for Public Use, 
supra note 187.  At the Green Space Grant’s inception, former WDNR Secretary Scott 
Hassett said that “[t]urning urban brownfields into parks, libraries and soccer fields is as 
critical to growing Wisconsin’s economy as other factors,” and acknowledged that the Green 
Space Grant “helps communities rid themselves of environmental threats and blighted 
structures and replace them with new green spaces and public facilities.”  Id. 
263. Id. 
264. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
265. Hassett Announces New DNR Grants to Help Clean Up Brownfields for Public Use, 
supra note 187. 
266. E-mail from Shelley Fox, NR Grant Specialist, Wis. DNR, to author (Jan. 10, 2011, 
11:44:00 CST) (providing a list of four Wisconsin cities that have applied for at least $50,000 
in funding through the grant, but since no funds are available each city has received nothing). 
267. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Doyle Announces $850,000 to 
Clean Up Brownfields and Create Public Spaces, Jan. 17, 2007, available at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/ORG/aw/rr/rbrownfields/greenspace/gs-01-17-07.pdf. 
268. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.05(2)(a) (current through 669 Wis. Admin. Reg. 
(Oct. 1, 2011)). 
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twenty-year provision could impede that goal by being, in fact, too 
strict.269  This is especially so if “public benefit” is meant to be broadly 
construed, similar to “public improvement” in the subdivision 
development context described earlier,270 or if economic activity is 
actually a public benefit similar to those activities that have satisfied the 
public use doctrine in eminent domain contexts.271  Restructuring the 
twenty-year provision to account for a broader understanding of what a 
“public benefit” is could make the Grant more conducive to private 
development.  This can be done in a couple of ways. 
First, the state could leave the deed restriction as is, but maintain 
that private entities could own a property held for “public benefit” for 
twenty or more years and become eligible for Green Space Grant 
funding just as a public body could.  This is likely unfeasible because it 
would require a very broad interpretation of “public benefit” and also 
alterations of other administrative provisions that guide the Green 
Space Grant’s application.272  Moreover, private entities are not likely to 
develop only greenspace (though, they could, conceivably, use the 
funding for solely one portion of a larger development). 
Second, the state could mandate that if municipalities utilizing the 
Green Space Grant wish to sell a portion of the redeveloped land before 
the twenty-year deed restriction passes, they must then maintain a 
public-use easement over the property for park space.273  “Greened” 
brownfields are frequented by nearby residents and workforce,274 so a 
 
269. Making the deed restriction in the Green Space Grant more flexible, or even just 
allowing its guidelines to be read more liberally, is consistent with suggestions in other states 
that say interpreting laws more liberally could help overcome limitations to economic 
development.  See Reshwan, supra note 54, at 697 (highlighting that the Georgia General 
Assembly has suggested that, to encourage effective partnerships that could overcome 
economic limitations to development, the Redevelopment Powers Law in Georgia should be 
liberally construed). 
270. See Rogers Dev., Inc. v. Rock Cnty. Planning & Dev. Comm., 2003 WI App 13, 
¶ 13, 265 Wis. 2d 214, 666 N.W.2d 504. 
271. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
272. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 173.03(5).  Notably, an “‘[e]ligible project’ means the 
remediation and redevelopment of an eligible site or facility that has a long-term public 
benefit, including the preservation of green space, the development of recreational areas, or the 
use of a property by the local government.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Though the present 
language does not explicitly preclude any private economic development efforts from being 
public benefits, it seems that chapter 173 as a whole fails to consider the possibility. 
273. Schofield, supra note 113, at 980–82. 
274. Christopher De Sousa, Co-Dir. Brownfields Research Consortium, Presentation at 
Brownfields Study Group Meeting 13 (May 25, 2010), available at 
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cooperative effort involving an easement could be put to good use.  
More research should be done to determine the feasibility of using 
public-use easements to better facilitate private involvement in 
brownfields projects while still complying with the base goals of the 
Green Space Grant. 
Nonetheless, I think the best approach would be to keep the deed 
restriction as is, but build on what can be done with the property.  If a 
municipality develops a brownfield single-handedly, with the goal of 
using the brownfield for greenspace and using the Green Space Grant 
for cleanup assistance, the twenty-year provision should stay—and at 
the end of twenty years, the municipality should be able to do with the 
property as it wishes. 
However, the municipality should have an option to let a private 
entity develop on the property—in a planned context—so long as that 
private entity maintains part of the property redeveloped with assistance 
by the Green Space Grant, as its designated use, for perpetuity.  The 
Grant should allow municipalities and private entities to share in the 
development of greenspace and, ultimately, allow for part of the land 
cleaned up through the Green Space Grant to be converted into taxable, 
privately-owned property.  Requiring the portion developed as 
greenspace to be kept in that form for perpetuity would ensure that a 
“narrowly-read” conception of the public benefit requirement is met 
(i.e., a conception that excludes any form of private development from 
having a “public benefit”).  The idea of maintaining the public benefit 
for perpetuity was actually contemplated during the Grant’s planning 
stage before the twenty-year stipulation was set.275  Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to consider this option given the benefit a private 
developer would receive through added cleanup assistance that is 
otherwise unavailable to private entities. 
Furthermore, municipalities may consider purchasing and converting 
a contaminated lot into greenspace after long-realizing that the lot has 
lost potential for development in the private market.  Potentially, 
developers may become interested in the lot again upon realizing that 
cleanup would be paid for with public dollars or by simply noticing the 
 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/Org/aw/rr/rbrownfields/bsg/ (highlighting that 72% of survey 
respondents visited greened brownfields once per week, while 25% visited daily). 
275. See Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141 (the interviewee 
mentioned that initially the WDNR considered making the twenty-year provision of the 
Green Space Grant a deed restriction for perpetuity). 
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effect that the cleaned-up property had on the area’s business potential.  
Allowing part of the property to be sold gives municipalities in dire 
need of private investment a unique option for economic growth, while 
the “in perpetuity” provision ensures that a public benefit will be 
maintained.  In fact, this could work similar to the alliance approach 
described in Part III.C:276 A development could be simultaneously 
owned and operated by public and private entities; and the resulting 
PPP could make decisions to sell the redeveloped greenspace to other 
private entities for private development, or, it could maintain portions 
of the land as public greenspace that is publicly maintained while 
allowing private developments on the remaining land. 
A $200,000 cleanup award may seem minuscule in the big picture, 
but that amount could be instrumental to facilitating redevelopment 
because one award can trigger more project investment and 
awareness.277  More importantly, since banks are so reluctant to offer 
loans for brownfields redevelopments, giving municipalities other 
methods to cleanse brownfields for interested private developers may 
help those developers secure loans.278  Restructuring the Green Space 
Grant and applicable chapter 173 guidelines to allow private entities to 
do what they want with portions of brownfields that are made ready-to-
reuse, so long as the other part of the plot is maintained as greenspace 
for perpetuity, ensures that public benefit exists and fosters private-
party interest.  If this provision is implemented, then private entities 
could offset cost disincentives, and brownfields might even become 
more attractive to developers than greenfields—which, for many 
reasons, such as pollution, sprawl reduction, and municipal economic 
and job interests, may be an ideal result.  Further, allowing a 
 
276. For a description of the alliance approach that is used in some northwestern 
European brownfields projects and an example of its use in Nantes, France, see supra Part 
III.C and note 134. 
277. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141.  Particularly, if the 
public is willing to spend money on a project, then private investors might become less risk 
averse when it comes to investing their own funds, which demonstrates how one award’s 
influence could trickle down to other funding sources as well.  See Greenspace Uses, supra 
note 45, at 2 (highlighting an Atlanta brownfields redevelopment project where one of the 
development partners said that a small EPA award helped move the project forward and 
“legitimize” the project because the award “showed that [the project] passed a level of 
scrutiny in a national competition”). 
278. See Telephone Interview with Mark Wendorf, supra note 23 (where the interviewee 
insisted that the singular commercial development in recent years since the Ann Street 
redevelopment began would not have happened without public support because the 
developer’s bank was frightened by funding a brownfield project). 
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municipality to partition off cleaned-up property that it owns 
encourages cost-sharing, promotes efficiency, and alleviates risk—all 
marks of successful brownfields remediation efforts.279  Because this 
suggestion is based on the Green Space Grant, the large economic and 
even larger environmental benefits of redeveloping brownfields into 
greenspace—and the original purpose of the Green Space Grant—are 
still in place. 
Ultimately, the Green Space Grant must be maintained, not ignored 
or stripped of funding.  If it is maintained, it should incorporate more 
flexible measures, such as those described in Part VI.B. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Success obtained by WPRI prompted the WDNR to apply to the 
EPA for an additional $1 million to continue funding that initiative.280  
The momentum resulting from WPRI’s success should be used to 
promote greenspace initiatives and implement more innovative 
greenspace redevelopment measures.  The Green Space Grant, when 
initially funded, was a creative and innovative approach that helped 
spark brownfield cleanup efforts, and the Oshkosh and Delavan success 
stories show that marginal funding for small greenspace contributions 
can be helpful to certain projects.  However, stripping that movement 
away by not funding the Green Space Grant crushes any momentum 
previously obtained. 
Municipalities may shy away from adding greenspace because of the 
costs they perceivably incur by maintaining it—especially since many 
municipalities are currently having trouble funding their park systems.281  
Yet, Milwaukee has seen over seventy brownfields success cases since 
2000, and estimates show that for every $1.00 the city put in, it received 
$37.00 of private investment.282  Thus, areas plagued by brownfields 
should strongly consider using their own available funds and grant 
packages because private investment likely follows those investments. 
 
279. Van Hook et al., supra note 122, at 149. 
280. See Marek & Gore, supra note 179, at 1, 3. 
281. Telephone Interview with Michael Prager, supra note 141; see also DE SOUSA, 
supra note 5, at 190 (“[T]he financial challenges involved in cleaning up, constructing, and 
even justifying the expenditure of funds for greening projects is very difficult given the 
budgetary predicaments of many cities and states.”). 
282. David Misky, Assistant Exec. Dir.—Sec’y, Redev. Auth. of the City of Milwaukee, 
Presentation at the Minn. Brownfields Reclaiming Recalcitrant Brownfields Forum 36 (Nov. 
23, 2010), http://assets.mnbrownfields.org/Misky_CityMilwaukee.pdf. 
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Whether the budget will provide funds is one aspect, but the laws 
that control grant and award packages for potential brownfields 
redevelopments must be flexible enough to induce interest and promote 
activity.  Wisconsin should attempt to incorporate greenspace 
developments and PPPs into its existing brownfields programs, but the 
laws must allow for such flexibility—strictly limiting “public benefit” 
solely to municipally-operated projects ignores the potential public gains 
made by encouraging private involvement, such as increased tax 
revenue and jobs.  The Oshkosh and Delavan developments show that 
marginal greenspace investment by the state can go a long way toward 
economic progress in blighted areas—even during an economic 
recession.  So, even though the Green Space Grant maxes out at 
$200,000, using the Grant to help fund PPP efforts could bring a mixture 
of public benefit and private investment to struggling areas, with the 
potential to trigger economic activity. 
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